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George S. Geis 
ABSTRACT—The law of third-party beneficiaries considers whether an 
outsider can sue for damages on a contract formed by others. Some might 
believe that external claims are never allowed in private contracting because 
privity is required to maintain a lawsuit. This is incorrect, though the 
mistake would be understandable because third-party interests are largely 
treated as a postscript on contract law. This disregard for third-party rights 
is surprising, however, because the legal treatment of beneficiaries is a 
major source of contention in contract law. Hundreds of cases are litigated 
annually—in part because the standard for perfecting rights in this area is so 
ambiguous. Moreover, careful reflection on third-party-beneficiary 
contracting uncovers a powerful, even foundational, tool that can be used to 
adjust legal relationships in diverse areas of activity. Simply put, third-
party-beneficiary contracts are quite different from bilateral contracts 
because they allow a promisor to adjust her legal rights with many, many 
others in one fell swoop by interposing a willing counterparty and setting 
the desired terms—a practice I will call “broadcast contracting.” This 
Article describes the phenomenon of broadcast contracting, analyzes the 
theoretical rationale for these arrangements, and proposes some normative 
principles for incorporating broadcast contracts into a sensible system of 
contract law. I make two primary claims. First, the law should continue to 
empower private counterparties to establish these agreements and thereby 
confer rights on outsiders. Second, legal treatment of third-party claims 
relies far too heavily on conjecture about a vague standard; in this context, 
at least, the goals of contract law would be better served by moving toward 
a rule that insists on explicit grants of third-party rights as a precondition to 
outside liability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The air was thick in Iowa City on March 6, 1982. The beloved Iowa 
Hawkeye men’s basketball team, under the leadership of Coach Lute Olson, 
was one game away from the Big Ten Championship. Only the Purdue 
Boilermakers, the final opponent of the regular season, stood in the way. It 
was a tight game, and as the final seconds ticked away, referee James Bain 
whistled a dubious foul on Iowa that sent a Purdue teammate to the free 
throw line. It was a lousy call, and fans were outraged when the shots fell 
and Purdue claimed the game, 66–65, in the final seconds.1 
Over the next few days, a nearby novelty store, Hawkeye John’s 
Trading Post, began to sell a T-shirt picturing a man with a noose around 
his neck. Captioned “James Bain Fan Club,” the shirt immediately attracted 
the attention of frustrated Hawkeye fans. Bain soon learned of the T-shirt 
and filed a lawsuit seeking both injunctive relief and damages.2 The owners 
of Hawkeye John’s refused to go quietly, however, and they launched a 
counterclaim against Bain.3 The theory sounded in contract law and insisted 
that Hawkeye John’s was a third-party beneficiary of the employment 
contract between Bain and the Big Ten Athletic Conference.4 
 
1  THE LAFAYETTE JOURNAL AND COURIER PRESENTS: MOST MEMORABLE MOMENTS IN PURDUE 
BASKETBALL HISTORY 111–14 (Jim Lefko, ed., 1998) (detailing the facts of the game in a chapter 
entitled “1982: Purdue Upsets the Hawkeyes 66–65”). 
2  Bain v. Gillispie, 357 N.W.2d 47, 48 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). 
3  Id. 
4  Id. at 50. 
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As the argument went, Bain’s rotten refereeing breached his contract 
with the Big Ten. This, in turn, eliminated Iowa from the championship and 
cost Hawkeye John’s nearly $200,000 in lost profits from forfeited sales of 
Big Ten Championship memorabilia.5 Further, Hawkeye John’s contended 
that it was protected legally as a beneficiary of Bain’s employment contract 
and was therefore entitled to sue Bain directly for damages related to his 
“baneful and outrageous” officiating, conducted “with a heedless disregard 
for the rights” of the Trading Post.6 
While suing a bad referee for malpractice should elicit a chuckle from 
every disappointed sports fan, the Iowa courts were unwilling to accept this 
theory.7 As the trial judge (sensibly) reasoned, “Heaven knows what 
uncharted morass a court would find itself in if it were to hold that an 
athletic official subjects himself to liability every time he might make a 
questionable call. The possibilities are mind boggling.”8 
But despite its loss, Hawkeye John’s was throwing a legitimate legal 
half-courter, one that is attempted in numerous cases each year.9 Contract 
law does indeed permit third-party beneficiaries to maintain direct claims 
against a breaching promisor and, under certain circumstances, recover 
damages despite a lack of privity.10 This is surprising to some, probably 
because this topic receives so little attention in contract law scholarship. 
Few teach this material. Most treatises and casebooks save it for the end.11 
And while the topic was a favorite (some might say obsessive) scholarly 
pursuit for Arthur Corbin in the 1920s,12 it now functions almost as an 
 
5  Id. at 48. The team did advance to the NCAA tournament, where it was eliminated in the second 
round by the University of Idaho. See 1981–1982 Iowa Men’s Basketball Schedule, FANBASE, http://
www.fanbase.com/Iowa-Hawkeyes-Mens-Basketball-1981-82/schedule (last visited Aug. 8, 2012). 
6  Bain, 357 N.W.2d at 48. 
7  Id. at 50. 
8  Id. at 49–50 (quoting the trial judge). 
9  A Westlaw key number search on 95k187, Agreement for Benefit of Third Person, results in more 
than one thousand distinct legal opinions for the ten-year period ending January 2012. 
10  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981); 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 10.3 (3d. ed. 2004); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON 
CONTRACTS § 130 (4th ed. 2001); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 17.4 
(6th ed. 2009). 
11  See, e.g., IAN AYRES & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 1168–91 (7th ed. 
2008) (chapter nine of nine); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 843–71 (9th 
ed. 2008) (chapter seven of seven); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 880–914 (7th ed. 2008) (chapter ten of ten); ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, 
CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 1001–46 (4th ed. 2007) (chapter eleven of eleven). 
12  Corbin published at least six articles on the topic: Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of 
Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J. 1008 (1918); Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons 
in Connecticut, 31 YALE L.J. 489 (1922); Arthur L. Corbin, The Law of Third Party Beneficiaries in 
Pennsylvania, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1928); Arthur L. Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of 
Contractors’ Surety Bonds, 38 YALE L.J. 1 (1928); Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third 
Persons, 46 L.Q.R. 12 (1930); and Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons in the 
Federal Courts, 39 YALE L.J. 601 (1930). 
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obscure postscript to contract law, attracting very little academic 
commentary in recent years.13 
But third-party-beneficiary contracting is hardly an afterthought. It is a 
powerful, even foundational, tool that can be used to adjust legal 
relationships across wide swaths of activity. Bond issuers adopt a third-
party-beneficiary framework to limit investor strike suits and concentrate 
performance-monitoring efforts.14 Employers use the arrangement to 
contract into heightened standards of legal duty, such as binding themselves 
not to discriminate against employees in a same-sex relationship.15 
Businesses use a third-party-beneficiary framework to weave nets of 
economic cooperation outside of a firm’s formal borders.16 Indeed, because 
many aspects of a corporation can be seen as a nexus of contracts,17 
economic actors might even establish private business statutes, essentially 
contracting for new varieties of corporate entities. 
Unfortunately, the common law of third-party-beneficiary contracting 
provides a very crude scale with which to weigh the legitimate economic 
gains from what I will call “broadcast contracting” against the negative 
effects that can occur. Broadcast contracting is the adoption of private 
agreements to create a heightened legal commitment to a defined class of 
third parties. A promisor contracts with a willing counterparty, identifies 
the desired group of outside beneficiaries, and sets binding new rules en 
masse to govern her behavior. 
As I will argue, the flexibility, reach, and precision of broadcast 
contracting can conceivably allow a promisor to make commitments that 
increase social welfare or cut transaction costs across many different 
economic settings. But the open-ended nature of the law, and the difficulty 
in distinguishing intended beneficiaries (who do have legal rights) from 
incidental beneficiaries (who do not), generates powerful incentives to 
pursue specious litigation. Hawkeye John’s claim for referee malpractice is 
 
13  Notable exceptions include Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1358 (1992), and Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party 
Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985). 
14  See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 241–42 (6th ed. 
2008). 
15  See infra notes 93–100 and accompanying text. 
16  See George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 241, 263–64 (2010) (listing “third party monitoring” as a contractual variable used by clients and 
vendors in structuring their outsourcing relationships). 
17  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 1 (2002); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organization Law, 
110 YALE L.J. 387, 391–93 (2000). But see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (disputing this conception of a corporation); 
Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 
515, 569 (2007) (“[A] corporation is more than a nexus of contracts or group of assets; it has the legal 
rights and obligations of a person.”). 
106:1153  (2012) Broadcast Contracting 
 1157
just one example. The lack of recent attention on this topic has also fostered 
numerous half-truths and inaccuracies in our judicial opinions.18 
This Article describes and analyzes the phenomenon of broadcast 
contracting. It seeks to answer the following questions: How do broadcast 
contracts work? Why might a party wish to write a broadcast contract? And 
how should the law deal with an outsider’s claim for damages in this 
context? In short, I set forth a framework for understanding broadcast 
contracting and offer normative principles for the legal treatment of these 
relationships. 
I will make two primary claims. First, there are logical reasons why 
two contracting parties might wish their relationship to include third-party-
beneficiary rights, and the law should continue to empower private 
counterparties to confer this authority on outsiders. Second, the legal 
treatment of third-party claims relies far too heavily on judicial conjecture 
about vague standards and ambiguous classification rubrics.19 Our legal 
system would be better served, at least in this context, by moving towards a 
rule-based approach that insists on explicit grants of third-party rights as a 
precondition to outside liability. In other words, we should demand very 
clear evidence before determining that two parties have indeed sought to 
broadcast contract rights to outsiders.20 
 
18  See, e.g., Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir. 1972) (refusing to recognize 
any action in contract or remedy for breach absent privity); Verosol B.V. v. Hunter Douglas, Inc., 806 F. 
Supp. 582, 586 (E.D. Va. 1992) (“Under well-settled principles of contract law, a stranger to a contract 
ordinarily has no rights under the contract and cannot sue to enforce it.”); Twine v. Liberty Nat’l Life 
Ins. Co., 311 So. 2d 299, 305 (Ala. 1975) (holding that a stranger to the contract could not take 
advantage of its breach); Anderson v. First Northtown Nat’l Bank, 361 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985) (“Strangers to a contract acquire no rights under such a contract.”); Grgic v. Cochran, 689 
S.W.2d 687, 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that subcontractors owe no duty to the owner of the 
project on which they work in the absence of privity of contract). 
19  See infra Part I.B. 
20  I should clarify at the outset a quick point related to the scope of analysis. A subset of third-party-
beneficiary claims involves government contracts. A taxpayer, for example, grows angry when a vendor 
breaches its contract with the government—say to build a road or bridge that is safe—and the taxpayer 
sues the vendor as a third-party beneficiary of this contract. See, e.g., Jennifer Sapp, Aging Out of Foster 
Care: Enforcing the Independent Living Program Through Contract Liability, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2861, 2884–94 (2008) (discussing the use of third-party-beneficiary law to impose liability in the foster 
care context); Waters, supra note 13, at 1173–1208 (discussing the use of third-party-beneficiary law to 
secure the protection of public programs enacted via statute). The Restatement establishes a different 
approach, under § 313, to evaluate third-party-beneficiary claims in the government-contracting context. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 (1981). The U.S. Supreme Court has recently 
addressed this issue in a case determining whether beneficiaries of a contract between the federal 
government and various drug manufacturers could sue for breach. See Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara 
Cnty., 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1345 (2011) (denying the right to bring a contract action as a third-party 
beneficiary in this context). I will specifically exclude public government contracts from assessment, as 
these arrangements present different legal issues from private contracting and involve considerations 
more closely related to the determination of private rights of action in statutory interpretation. Rather, 
my focus in this Article is on private contracting, typically between sophisticated parties who understand 
the nature of their exchange. 
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The Article is organized as follows. Part I reviews the law of third-
party beneficiaries and the ongoing struggle to categorize and adjudicate 
these claims. Part II presents an economic analysis of broadcast contracting, 
examining and illustrating the basic mechanism, breadth of applicability, 
and theoretical benefits of one-stop multilateral commitment. Part III 
finishes by evaluating the normative fit between current law and an optimal 
system for governing third-party rights in the broadcast contracting context. 
I conclude that our present approach to third-party beneficiaries is largely a 
function of excessive historical abstraction and the resulting adoption of a 
vague and difficult-to-apply standard. Ultimately, the development of law 
in this area would be better served by moving towards an approach that 
adopts clearer rules to govern the conveyance of third-party rights. A brief 
conclusion summarizes my claims. 
I. THE LAW OF THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES 
A. Background 
When can a third party collect damages on a contract formed by two 
other people? At first blush, it is tempting to answer “never”—that is, legal 
liability for broken contracts should extend only to a direct counterparty. If 
Abe promises to pay Beth $50 to mow Cam’s lawn, then Abe, not Cam, 
should sue Beth when she fails to perform.21 After all, how can an outsider, 
even one who might suffer greatly from breach, possibly bring a claim? He 
had no say in forming the contract; why should he have rights? The 
aggrieved third party might, of course, encourage the original promisee to 
pursue the claim, especially if the promisee clearly indicated a desire to 
benefit the third party (and therefore presumably maintains some interest in 
seeing the performance take place). But, historically, contract law would 
not sanction direct action by an independent third party against the 
breaching promisor.22 
Agency law offered a partial workaround to this problem, as contracts 
made between an agent and a third party (under authority) bind the 
principal.23 But this requires a heightened legal status—where the agent 
agrees to act for the benefit of the principal and subject to her control—that 
analytically links the principal and third party in privity.24 Further, the 
 
21  Terminology is important here and worth clarifying: the promisor is the party making a promise 
that will benefit some third party, the promisee is the initial contractual counterparty to the promisor 
(who very likely made a reciprocal promise to the promisor in order to induce the bargain), and a third-
party beneficiary is a party independent of the contract who will nevertheless benefit in some manner 
from the performance of the promisor. In the simple example above, Abe is the promisee, Beth is the 
promisor, and Cam is the third-party beneficiary. 
22  See Waters, supra note 13, at 1112–13. 
23  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (2006). 
24  Id. § 1.01. 
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ongoing legal responsibilities of the three parties differ greatly in the 
agency context, as the agent is typically excused from any contractual 
liability and therefore drops out of the picture.25 This is simply a 
representative arrangement, and most adversely affected contractual 
bystanders—such as Cam in the example above—would not enjoy such a 
relationship and would therefore receive no help from agency law. 
Over time, contract law began to change, in fits and starts, to permit 
third-party beneficiaries to recover damages directly, in certain contexts, for 
a promisor’s breach. The historical development of this rule is debated in 
the literature. Anthony Waters argues that the now-famous case of 
Lawrence v. Fox26 “defied the prevailing rules of contractual liability” and 
“gave us the initial formulation of the third party beneficiary rule.”27 Melvin 
Eisenberg describes the evolution of the rule as a more gradual affair, 
emphasizing both earlier cases in English and American law that paved the 
way for Lawrence28 and the relative unimportance of Lawrence in 
comparison to the legal developments that followed.29 Certainly the early 
1900s were a time of great balkanization for third-party-beneficiary rights. 
Some jurisdictions resisted the rule entirely,30 following the formalist logic 
of Langdell31 and Justice Holmes.32 Others allowed claims only in a limited 
 
25  Id. § 6.01. The exceptions here occur when an agent negotiates a contract with a third party for an 
unidentified or undisclosed principal. In these contexts, the agent may be liable for the contract by 
default. Id. §§ 1.04(2), 6.02–.03. An agent may also assume ongoing contractual liability by agreement 
with the third party. 
26  20 N.Y. 268 (1859). 
27  Waters, supra note 13, at 1111, 1115. Waters traces the analytical backstory of this case in some 
detail, arguing that the judicial outcome was the result of an unusual factual situation (including 
potentially unenforceable gambling loans), a gap in several legal doctrines, creative lawyering, and an 
accommodating judiciary. 
28  See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1360–63 (“[I]n reality the case was not very remarkable for its 
time. . . . Lawrence v. Fox broke little or no new ground in New York.”). 
29  Id. at 1363. Eisenberg attributes the modern popularity of Lawrence to its three different 
opinions, each staking out a clear position on the topic: the Comstock opinion rejects third-party 
enforcement due to lack of privity, the Johnson opinion permits third-party enforcement via an agency 
theory, and the Gray opinion permits third-party enforcement without articulating an exact theory 
beyond “manifest justice.” Id. at 1364–65. Just eighteen years later, New York strictly limited the reach 
of Lawrence in Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280 (1877), though later cases zigged back the other way. 
See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1362–74. 
30  Massachusetts, for example, held out against the doctrine for decades before eventually yielding 
to the rule in 1979. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Foster, Public Housing Tenants as Third-Party Beneficiaries: 
Considering Ayala v. Boston Housing Authority, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 85, 87–92 (1992) (describing 
the Massachusetts case law and its eventual adoption of a third-party-beneficiary rule). 
31  See C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 79 (2d ed. 1880) (“[The 
principle] that a person for whose benefit a promise was made, if not related to the promisee, could not 
sue upon the promise . . . is so plain upon its face that it is difficult to make it plainer by argument.”). 
32  See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 340–41 (1881) (“The fact that a consideration was 
given yesterday by A to B, and a promise received in return, cannot be laid hold of by X, and transferred 
from A to himself. . . . How, in short, can a man sue or be sued on a promise in which he had no part?”). 
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number of difficult-to-distinguish contexts.33 And still others were more 
permissive.34 
Given the lack of clarity in this area for the first few decades of the 
20th century, the Restatement (First) of Contracts, completed in 1932, 
sought to synthesize the treatment of third-party beneficiaries into 
manageable distinctions.35 Accordingly, it divided potential third-party 
claimants into three groups: creditor beneficiaries, donee beneficiaries, and 
incidental beneficiaries.36 The first two groups had legally enforceable 
rights, while the latter group did not. The borders between each group 
eluded precise definition, and as we will see, the distinctions were 
ultimately abandoned.37 But a creditor–beneficiary relationship was 
generally understood to arise when a promisee sought to elicit a vow from 
the promisor to repay an obligation that the promisee owed to the third 
party.38 For example, if Abe happened to owe Cam $50 from prior dealings, 
then Abe might arrange for a “ring-around-the-rosie” form of repayment, 
instead of paying Cam directly, by entering into the lawn mowing 
transaction with Beth that is described above. 
By contrast, a donee–beneficiary relationship arose when, in the words 
of Restatement (First), “it appears from the terms of the promise in view of 
the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in 
obtaining the promise of . . . performance thereof is [(i)] to make a gift to 
the beneficiary or [(ii)] to confer upon him a right against the promisor.”39 
In other words, Cam might be a donee–beneficiary under the initial deal 
between Abe and Beth, even without a prior debt from Abe to Cam, as long 
as the contract clearly spelled out an intention for Abe to convey a gift of 
the performance to Cam. Likewise, even if there were no explicit gift 
statement, Cam might enjoy legal standing if Abe’s bargain with Beth could 
somehow be understood as conveying a right for Cam to sue in the event of 
breach. 
It takes some work to distinguish between these two types of donee–
beneficiaries, but analytically it should indeed be possible for a promisee to 
seek to confer enforcement rights to a third party, even apart from any 
 
33  Williston apparently supported contextual third-party rights, at least initially, but struggled to 
reconcile his belief that “justice requires some remedy to be given the beneficiary” with his formal view 
of contract law. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 357, at 683 (1st ed. 1920). He 
eventually staked out a position in his treatise that a third-party claimant should not be able to maintain a 
suit in a court of law but that such a claim could prevail in a court of equity. This distinction did not 
carry over, however, to Williston’s work on the restatement of contract law. See Eisenberg, supra note 
13, at 1366 & n.37. 
34  See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1366–70. 
35  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 133, 135–136 (1932). 
36  Id. 
37  See infra notes 44–51 and accompanying text. 
38  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(b). 
39  Id. § 133(1)(a). 
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desire to make a gift of the actual performance. For example, a promisee 
might wish to grant enforcement rights to an outsider, for various strategic 
reasons,40 even when the subject of the contractual performance does not 
directly or primarily benefit that third party. The much harder question, of 
course, is whether this desire for outside enforcement rights actually 
accompanies any given exchange. 
The third and final category, that of an incidental beneficiary, 
purportedly encompassed all other third parties.41 For example, Cam’s 
neighbor Dawn might also be adversely impacted by Beth’s failure to mow 
Cam’s lawn (because she has to look at the unsightly view or deal with 
weeds that blow over from Cam’s yard). But Dawn would only be 
considered an incidental beneficiary of the deal between Abe and Beth, and 
she could not sue Beth for breach.42 Even a party suffering more explicit 
pecuniary harm from the breach—such as the service station forfeiting the 
sale of gasoline that Beth would have purchased to perform the job—cannot 
recover if it is deemed an incidental beneficiary.43 
These distinctions may have sounded good to the drafters of the 
Restatement, but courts struggled consistently over the next decades to 
classify individual plaintiffs under this rubric. It was easy enough when, 
say, a prior creditor relationship existed between the promisee and a third 
party—or when the promisee clearly manifested a gift intention. But 
distinguishing the second type of donee beneficiary—where enforcement 
rights were conferred without an explicit gift intention—from incidental 
beneficiaries proved especially tricky. Courts seemed to accept the 
possibility that a right to enforce the contract might be understood to have 
been conferred by implication, even without an explicit promise or 
statement to that effect. Accordingly, it became quite challenging for a 
judge to determine whether a promisee had actually sought enforcement 
rights for the third party or whether the claimant was merely a disappointed 
incidental beneficiary. Furthermore, this inquiry only took place, of course, 
when the financial stakes were significant enough to trigger litigation—so 
presumably the aggrieved third party could always point to some 
meaningful harm. Moreover, larger questions regarding intent remained. 
Why was the intent of the promisee controlling to begin with? Wouldn’t it 
make more sense to look at the objectives of both contracting parties?44 
 
40  See infra Part II.C. 
41  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(c). 
42  E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 illus. 16 (1981) (“B contracts with A to 
erect an expensive building on A’s land. C’s adjoining land would be enhanced in value by the 
performance of the contract. C [cannot bring suit for breach under the contract].”). 
43  Id. § 302 illus. 17 (“B contracts with A to buy a new car manufactured by C. C is an incidental 
beneficiary, even though the promise can only be performed if money is paid to C.”). 
44  See, e.g., Am. Fin. Corp. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1182, 1184–85 (D. Del. 1983) 
(“[B]oth parties must in some manner express an intent to benefit the third-party before third-party 
beneficiary status is found.”); Manor Junior Coll. v. Kaller’s Inc., 507 A.2d 1245, 1246–48 (Pa. Super. 
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Throughout this time, the influential Yale contracts scholar Arthur 
Corbin continued to press for fewer discrete categories of beneficiaries, 
arguing that it was senseless to parse the distinctions of Restatement 
(First).45 Instead, Corbin advocated a simple binary framework—that of 
“intended” versus “incidental” beneficiaries—which would be grounded in 
fundamental notions of contractual intent (rather than the murkier corners of 
property, trust, and quasi-contract that continued to exert influence in this 
area).46 Corbin believed, in a nutshell, that third-party rights should be 
understood exactly like any other term in a contract, attaching through the 
express or implicit intentions of promisor and promisee.47 This test is 
arguably not any easier to apply, but it has emerged as the modern 
touchstone of third-party-beneficiary law.48 With continued prodding from 
Corbin,49 the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reoriented the inquiry 
along these lines, dropping the creditor and donee labels and focusing on 
the intentions of both contracting parties.50 According to § 302 of 
Restatement (Second), “Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and 
promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if 
recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to 
effectuate the intention of the parties. . . .”51 Said differently, the 
Restatement (Second) explicitly transferred the third-party-beneficiary 
 
Ct. 1986) (“[A] party does not become a third party beneficiary unless both parties to the contract 
express an intention to benefit the third party in the contract itself.”). 
45  See Waters, supra note 13, at 1169–72. 
46  Waters charts the evolution of third-party-beneficiary doctrine from obscure legal origins in 
property, trust, and quasi-contract to that of direct contractual intention. Id. at 1165–73. 
47  See 4 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE 
RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 774, at 8 (1951). 
48  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). 
49  Even into his eighties, Corbin seems to have sent detailed recommendations on the topic to 
Robert Braucher, the initial reporter of Restatement (Second). See Waters, supra note 13, at 1170. 
50  The authors of Restatement (Second) boasted that prior doctrinal categorization challenges  
have now been largely resolved . . . by recognition of the power of the promisor and promisee to 
create rights in a beneficiary by manifesting an intention to do so. . . . [T]he terms “donee” 
beneficiary and “creditor” beneficiary carry overtones of obsolete doctrinal difficulties . . . . 
Instead, the terms “intended” beneficiary and “incidental” beneficiary are used to distinguish 
beneficiaries who have rights from those who do not.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 intro. note. Any claims to resolve the complexities of 
classification were, however, undoubtedly premature.  
51  Id. § 302(1). This section goes on to require that “either (a) the performance of the promise will 
satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances indicate 
that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.” Id. (emphasis 
added). It is also worth noting that standard contract law defenses—such as duress, fraud, incapacity, 
illegality, mistake, unconscionability—will typically shield the promisor from third-party claims. See id. 
§ 309(1) (“[I]f a contract is voidable or unenforceable at the time of its formation the right of any 
beneficiary is subject to the infirmity.”); Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1413 (“The general rule . . . is that 
the promisor can raise against a recognized beneficiary any defense the promisor would have had 
against the promisee under the contract.”). 
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problem into a direct matter of contract interpretation: what terms did the 
initial counterparties mean to adopt for this exchange? 
But again, this merely frames the inquiry. It is easy enough to interpret 
a contract when the parties clearly spell out a desired term. Words can be 
opaque, however, and rational parties cannot take the time to include a 
written clause for every contingency.52 Thus, much of contract law deals 
with interpreting ambiguous or unstated terms—often by selecting default 
rules to fill gaps in incomplete agreements.53 And while this task is difficult 
enough for terms impacting a bilateral contractual relationship,54 imagine 
how the complications can multiply when outsiders are brought into the 
mix. Contracts govern vast expanses of activity, and undoubtedly the affairs 
of two counterparties will affect others—sometimes profoundly so. 
Moreover, the typical interpretation problem is compounded in the third-
party context because an outside party—conceivably many different outside 
parties—will be making arguments about contractual intentions for a deal 
that they did not personally negotiate.55 The next subpart discusses how 
lawmakers go about this task of determining the intentions of the initial 
counterparties with respect to outsider enforcement rights. 
B. Distinguishing Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries 
At the outset, it is important to note that contracting parties do not need 
to name an individual third-party beneficiary with specificity in order to 
create an enforceable right.56 While they are certainly free to do so, another 
 
52  See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 292–94 (6th ed. 2012); STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW chs. 13–16 (2004); Richard Craswell, 
Contract Law: General Theories, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS § 4000 (Boudewijn 
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 568–94 (2003). Moreover, parties will sometimes have 
incentives to preserve contractual ambiguity in order to argue for a preferred interpretation down the 
road. See George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664 
(2006); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 
814 (2006). 
53  See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87–89 (1989); George M. Cohen, Implied Terms and Interpretation in 
Contract Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 52, § 4400, at 78–99. 
54  See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete 
Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 161–63 (1994) (explaining the shortcomings of various approaches 
to contractual incompleteness, particularly the limits on judicial competence in gap filling); Eric A. 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 
829, 839–42 (2003) (describing the challenges and possible indeterminacy of the default rule project). 
55  The same is often true, of course, for organizational contracts where the corporate agent pursuing 
the firm’s claim may not be the same agent who initially negotiated the agreement for the firm. 
56  See Sec. Fund Servs., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 542 F. Supp. 323, 329 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 
(“[I]t is not necessary for the third party who is benefitted by the contract to be named therein if he is 
otherwise sufficiently described or designated.”); Pappas v. Jack O. A. Nelsen Agency, Inc., 260 
N.W.2d 721, 725–26 (Wis. 1978) (“[T]he precise identity of the third-party beneficiary need not be 
ascertainable at the time of the agreement so long as the agreement specifies or identifies a group or 
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viable approach is to identify an explicit group that should be imbued with 
third-party enforcement rights.57 For example, I might designate “all 
students in my current contract law class” as intended beneficiaries of my 
employment contract with the university.58 If so, a breach on my part, such 
as failure to show up for class one month, could presumably be litigated by 
any student in the course. I have not spelled out all sixty student names, but 
it is easy enough for a court to recognize who possesses outsider rights. 
The identification task grows taxing, however, if I name a more 
general group or make no mention of third-party beneficiaries. Suppose I 
specify “my students” as the intended third-party beneficiaries of a contract. 
Does this mean that both current students and former students can press a 
claim?59 How about my short course students at a different university? And 
what if the contract fails to state anything at all about students or third-party 
beneficiaries? Can a student still make out a claim when I stop coming to 
class? Part, but not all, of my academic duties include teaching; did the 
university and I intend to confer third-party enforcement rights to the 
students? Such concerns over unstated intentions are familiar to the task of 
contract interpretation. Yet, as we will see, the presence of many potential 
outside parties further complicates the analysis. 
Let us assume for the sake of discussion, then, that a promisor and 
promisee fail to identify any protected third parties, such that a court needs 
to determine whether a given outsider is an intended or incidental 
beneficiary. This presents an immediate follow-up question: should 
lawmakers use the objective or subjective intent of the contracting parties? 
In other words, do we care about the actual inner intentions of the parties or 
only about an objectively reasonable interpretation of the words and actions 
that manifest their intentions? This is another familiar concern in contract 
law, arising whenever a standard invokes contractual intent as the 
determinative legal crucible. 
For the most part, of course, contract law exhibits a clear preference 
for objective intent over subjective intent.60 Grant Gilmore has famously 
 
class to whom the party must belong to benefit thereby.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 308 (“It is not essential to the creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that he be identified when a 
contract containing the promise is made.”). 
57  Pappas, 260 N.W.2d at 725–26. 
58  My students might take issue with the word “beneficiary.” 
59  The example ignores damages. 
60  Judges over the years have developed especially colorful ways of expressing this concept. See, 
e.g., Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Walters stoutly maintains that 
he subjectively intended to be bound . . . . Yet ‘intent’ does not invite a tour through Walters’s cranium, 
with Walters as the guide. . . . ‘The intent of the parties [to be bound] must necessarily be derived from a 
consideration of their words, written and oral, and their actions.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Household Utils., Inc. v. Andrews Co., 236 N.W.2d 663, 669 (Wis. 1974))); Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City 
Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (“A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the 
personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of 
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narrated the historical development of this inclination,61 and it can be seen 
throughout Restatement (Second).62 Offer and acceptance, for example, are 
famously governed by an objective test: we care about how reasonable 
people would interpret what someone says and does, not about their 
idiosyncratic inner musings. You cannot mentally reject an offer while 
simultaneously responding “OK, that sounds good.”63 There are 
undoubtedly legitimate questions about what objective intent means and 
whether this is something that courts can actually identify.64 But for many, 
this objective approach to contractual intent is a critical logical leap, needed 
to render the adjudicatory task tractable. 
Arguably, however, the identification of third-party-beneficiary rights 
presents even greater epistemological difficulties than the determination of 
contractual agreement. With offer and acceptance, there is typically a 
conversation, or some related interaction between the relevant parties, that 
can be used to inform an objective determination of agreement. How can 
judges unpack, in an objective manner, whether a contract that favors a 
given person or a group (directly or indirectly) manifests an intent to 
provide third-party recourse? Courts need to look beyond the mere fact of 
the benefit itself; otherwise anyone positively impacted by the contract 
could pursue a claim. But any recognition of a benefit with ambiguous 
intent to a third party is problematic. We are walking on very thin ice when 
we purport to objectively allow the claims of one group while insisting that 
other benefits or other groups are merely incidental and thus unenforceable. 
Some have argued, therefore, that the intended-beneficiary test only 
makes sense if courts embrace a subjective standard of intent. As Eisenberg 
puts it, “If the intent-to-benefit test is satisfied by objective intent, it 
provides no guidance on the issue the test, as so formulated, makes 
critical.”65 According to this view, the very exercise of dividing intended 
and incidental beneficiaries requires a focus on the actual (subjective) 
mental state of the parties. 
This is too strong of a statement, however, as the objective test might 
still be used to shed light on third-party rights. Some cases are not too 
difficult: many people would find an intent to benefit Cam in the initial 
lawn mowing example, regardless of the standard adopted. Likewise, few 
 
law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known 
intent.”). 
61  See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 42–43 (2d ed. 1995). 
62  E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1981). 
63  Many who have studied the doctrine in this context will recall the binding land-sale contract of 
two barroom negotiators who were “high as a Georgia pine.” Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 519 (Va. 
1954). 
64  See GILMORE, supra note 61, at 47 (famously describing the objective test as “the great 
metaphysical solvent”). 
65  See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1379. 
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people could argue with a straight face that either the Big Ten Athletic 
Conference or the referee it contracted with had a subjective intent to 
benefit an unaffiliated retail store in Iowa City.66 It is more difficult to 
articulate exactly why this is so—but this is the challenge whenever we 
seek to objectify something.67 To the extent that objectivity means anything 
in contract law, it could play a role here as well.68 Of course, intending to 
benefit third parties and intending to give them private rights to enforce a 
breach are not the same thing, and this distinction might matter when 
crafting an approach to third-party claims.69 
Given this uncertainty, it should perhaps not be too surprising that 
while courts often claim to follow the binary approach of Restatement 
(Second), it is common to see the use of finer grain tools, tests, and maxims 
for determining whether third-party rights attach. One approach is to insist 
on a heightened standard, requiring something like a “clear,” “definite,” or 
“express” intent to benefit a third party.70 This may deter the filing of some 
tenuous claims, but it is unlikely that these extra words provide much 
guidance for close inquiries. Less commonly, judges may require that the 
intent to empower a third party is located in the actual words of agreement 
or text of the contract.71 This approach has significant advantages, and I will 
argue later in this Article that greater use of formalism would be a welcome 
 
66  See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
67  A related problem involves the choice of contextual facts and circumstances to bring into the 
analysis. For example, the contracting parties might designate a fringe group (such as Hawkeye John’s) 
as an intended beneficiary, and, if so, this fact should be brought into the objective analysis. A promisee 
who insists that, despite specific contractual language to the contrary, he subjectively did not intend to 
convey third-party rights would have a lot of explaining to do. 
68  Some room also remains under the Restatement (Second) conception of third-party rights for a 
subjective analysis of intention. The challenge of melding objective and subjective standards is not 
unique to third-party-beneficiary rights; other branches of contract law take a similar approach to intent. 
The meaning of a satisfaction condition, for example, will be interpreted under either an objective or a 
subjective standard depending on the contracting context. The law prefers to evaluate satisfaction 
clauses under an objective standard but will allow parties to insist on subjective satisfaction of 
performance with highly aesthetic features such as portrait paintings. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 228 & illus. 4 (1981). So contract law has some experience uncovering the meaning of 
subjective intent—though I would argue that efforts here are fraught with uncertainty. I challenge 
anyone, for example, to distinguish practically (not conceptually with the band-aid of good faith) 
between a subjective satisfaction condition (legally binding) and an agreement lacking mutuality of 
obligation (unenforceable). 
69  In other words, we might select a default that requires more than just an objective intent to benefit 
before awarding outside enforcement rights. See infra Part III.B.1. 
70  See, e.g., Khabbaz v. Swartz, 319 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Iowa 1982) (requiring express intent); 
Snyder Plumbing & Heating Corp. v. Purcell, 195 N.Y.S.2d 780, 783 (App. Div. 1960) (requiring clear 
intent); see also Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1379 & n.80. 
71  See, e.g., Sec. Fund Servs., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 542 F. Supp. 323, 329 (N.D. Ill. 
1982); Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett, 178 N.E. 498, 501 (Ill. 1931) (“[T]he right of a third party 
benefited by a contract to sue thereon rests upon the liability of the promisor, and this liability must 
affirmatively appear from the language of the instrument when properly interpreted and construed.”). 
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development in the law of third-party beneficiaries.72 A textual prerequisite 
is far from universal, however, and it is admittedly in tension with the tools 
used to interpret contracts in some other contexts.73 Interpretive problems 
also persist when, as discussed above, a contract states that it intends to 
convey enforcement rights to a general group without specifically 
identifying the members of that group.74 
Still another approach is to impose additional substantive hurdles. For 
example, in order for rights to attach, a judge may require that the third 
party directly receive some form of performance.75 This obviously dovetails 
nicely with the creditor–beneficiary context, as a payment in money or kind 
is promised directly to the third party. Similarly, the requirement of third-
party receipt of performance is typically satisfied in the direct-donee 
context, such as Abe and Beth’s initial lawn mowing contract. But the 
direct-performance rule eliminates the possibility of recovery when 
performance is provided to the initial counterparty—presumably even if 
both counterparties wish to empower a third-party beneficiary to sue. As I 
discuss below,76 this is not always a sensible or desirable outcome. 
In summary, courts have experimented with a messy mix of strategies 
for giving content to the imprecise distinction between intended and 
incidental beneficiaries. These include a focus on the language of the 
promise, the intentions or purposes of the parties, vague notions of utility or 
fairness, and even less explicit assertions about the needs of various 
commercial settings. This chaotic attitude toward third-party rights is 
perhaps understandable in light of the ambiguous legal mandate, but it 
would be helpful to have a legal approach that provides private parties with 
more certainty at the time of contracting and judges with more guidance at 
the time of adjudication. 
C. Modification of Third-Party Rights 
Finally, what happens if the initial counterparties attempt to modify the 
rights of a third-party beneficiary? Does the modification stick, or are the 
rights somehow vested in the third party such that they cannot be clawed 
back by subsequent counterparty agreement? Presumably, no problems 
 
72  See infra Part III.B.1. 
73  Eisenberg seems to reject a formalist approach for this reason, arguing that “[t]he better-reasoned 
cases reject these formal requirements.” Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1379. The indefiniteness doctrine 
is, however, an important exception to this proclivity toward gap filling and might serve as a useful 
model for our understanding of third-party-beneficiary rights. See infra notes 185–94. 
74  Some courts requiring explicit textual support for third-party rights do allow these general 
statements of intent to satisfy the inquiry. See, e.g., Hylte Bruks Aktiebolag v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 
399 F.2d 289, 292–93 (2d Cir. 1968); Am. Fin. Corp. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1182, 1186 
(D. Del. 1983). 
75  E.g., Carson Pirie Scott, 178 N.E. at 503–04. 
76  See infra Parts II.A–C. 
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arise if two counterparties renegotiate a contract to phase in third-party 
enforcement rights to an individual or group that did not previously enjoy 
legal protection. We can analyze this modification just like an initial grant 
of third-party rights. But what happens if the promisor and promisee have a 
change of heart and seek to rescind rights that were previously granted to a 
third-party beneficiary? 
Contract law has struggled with this question. Some early cases treated 
the situation like that of any other contractual renegotiation, holding that a 
valid modification did indeed impact third-party rights and could extinguish 
outside enforcement privileges.77 Other courts spoke of “vested rights” and 
refused to allow the initial counterparties to take back outside enforcement 
power—even though these contracting parties were the ones who 
established those rights in the first place.78 In the midst of this uncertainty, 
Restatement (First) took a controversial position, stating that the initial 
counterparties could modify away the rights of creditor beneficiaries but not 
those of donee beneficiaries.79 Because many third-party-beneficiary cases 
fell into this latter category, Restatement (First) effectively established a 
default rule of irrevocability outside the creditor context. It was not at all 
clear, however, that this was an optimal or analytically consistent 
approach.80 
Indeed, in the ensuing years many courts and commentators rejected 
Restatement (First)’s solution to the modification problem.81 Accordingly, 
the drafters of Restatement (Second) decided to advance a very different 
proposition.82 Section 311 of Restatement (Second) reversed the rule of 
irrevocability to a presumption of revocability subject to a few exceptions.83 
Specifically, the initial counterparties may not modify away third-party 
rights under three circumstances: (1) the counterparties state at the outset 
that these rights are not subject to alteration,84 (2) the third-party beneficiary 
materially changes her position in justifiable reliance on the promise before 
 
77  See, e.g., Biddel v. Brizzolara, 30 P. 609, 612 (Cal. 1883); Gilbert v. Sanderson, 9 N.W. 293, 295 
(Iowa 1881). 
78  See, e.g., Filley v. Ill. Life Ins. Co., 137 P. 793, 794–95 (Kan. 1914); Marquet v. Aetna Life Ins. 
Co., 159 S.W. 733, 735 (Tenn. 1913). 
79  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 142–143 (1932). 
80  See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1416–17 (criticizing the approach and analytical justification for 
irrevocability in the donee–beneficiary context as inconsistent with contract law’s approach to other gift 
promises, which are freely revocable). 
81  See, e.g., McCulloch v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 53 F. Supp. 534, 545 (D. Minn. 1943); Wolosoff v. 
Gadsden Land & Bldg. Corp., 18 So. 2d 568, 571 (Ala. 1944); William H. Page, The Power of the 
Contracting Parties to Alter a Contract for Rendering Performance to a Third Person, 12 WIS. L. REV. 
141 (1937). 
82  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1981). 
83  Id. § 311(2). 
84  Id. § 311(1). 
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the attempt at modification,85 or (3) the third-party beneficiary manifests 
assent to her rights at the behest of the promisor or promisee.86 It is hardly 
clear why the assent of an outsider to third-party enforcement rights should 
have legal impact on the modification powers of the initial counterparties.87 
But I will argue in Part III of this Article that Restatement (Second) treats 
this issue correctly with respect to a default rule of revocability subject to 
an exception for rights that are clearly deemed irrevocable in the ex ante 
agreement.88 This normative claim must wait, however, until I am able to 
develop a richer theory of third-party rights. 
To quickly summarize, contract law permits third parties to recover 
private damages from a breaching promisor if they fall into a legally 
protected class of outsiders. Historically, two types of beneficiaries—
creditor and donee beneficiaries—enjoyed this right. More recently, 
Restatement (Second) has replaced these terms with a direct inquiry into 
whether the initial counterparties intended to convey enforcement rights to a 
given outsider. Express contractual language stating that the third party is 
indeed an intended beneficiary is obviously a powerful way to establish 
intent. But courts will sometimes find intent through other contextual 
evidence. Finally, even if a third party does enjoy enforcement rights, that 
power is usually taken away (with a few exceptions where the rights are 
deemed to be “vested”) if the initial counterparties decide to modify their 
contract to remove the third-party-beneficiary status. Armed with this 
overview of the law, it is time to explore how parties are using third-party-
beneficiary provisions to write broadcast contracts and to think more 
generally about the costs and benefits of providing outside enforcement 
rights. Part II turns to an analysis of broadcast contracting. 
II. BROADCAST CONTRACTING 
Broadcast contracting involves the adoption of private agreements to 
establish a heightened legal commitment to a defined class of third parties. 
The promisor simply contracts with a willing counterparty, identifies the 
desired group of outside beneficiaries, and sets binding new rules to govern 
her behavior. This is a flexible tool, and the promisor might use this 
framework to broadcast private economic commitments to many different 
beneficiaries or even to write “new laws” in areas as diverse as tort, 
employment, property, and corporate law—really in any setting where she 
has the desire, for whatever reason, to bind her hands more tightly than the 
status quo mandates. I will begin by describing the basic mechanics of 
 
85  Id. § 311(3). 
86  Id. 
87  See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1419–21. Nor is it clear why a promisor or promisee might seek 
third-party assent. 
88  See infra Part III.B.3. 
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broadcast contracting, turn to some additional examples and applications, 
and offer a detailed theoretical account for why private parties might wish 
to broadcast a contractual commitment. The section concludes by 
examining some limits on the use of broadcast contracting to adjust legal 
rights en masse. 
A. Basic Mechanics 
It is easiest to illustrate the mechanics of broadcast contracting through 
an employment law example. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
famously prohibits employment discrimination based on “race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”89 This includes acts such as discriminatory 
hiring and firing, unequal compensation or job assignments, and various 
other terms and conditions of employment.90 But Title VII does not extend 
to employees in a same-sex relationship. Roughly twenty states and many 
cities and counties have enacted laws that address employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,91 but there is no unified 
legal standard. A proposed bill to ban discrimination in this context (the 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA)) has been introduced several 
times in Congress,92 but the prospects for enactment remain unclear. 
Several years ago, however, Professors Ian Ayres and Jennifer Gerarda 
Brown developed a private legal alternative.93 They established and 
registered a “Fair Employment” certification mark comprised of a simple 







89  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
90  Id. 
91  See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West Supp. 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 
2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102 
(West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (Supp. 2011); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-
606 (LexisNexis 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 363A.08 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 354-A:7 (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 28-1-7 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 659A.030 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (2009). 
92  See, e.g., J. Banning Jasiunas, Note, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a “Separate but Equal” Federal 
Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination?, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1529, 1535–36 (2000). 
93  Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a 
Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1639 (2006). This concept is also discussed in a book published 
by the same authors. IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: HOW TO 
MOBILIZE HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY RIGHTS ch. 4 (2005).  
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Any employer is permitted to license use of this mark, without charge, 
but the licensee must execute an agreement with the licensors, under which 
they promise not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.94 
Professors Ayres and Brown are busy people, however, and they will not be 
personally enforcing any future breach of this contract—indeed, they 
expressly waive all rights to do so in each agreement with a licensee.95 
Rather, Ayres and Brown empower several categories of third-party 
beneficiaries to bring an action for breach: “Licensee and Licensor agree to 
designate as express third-party beneficiaries . . . all persons and entities 
that would be entitled to sue if ENDA were in effect . . . including . . . all 
persons who are or have been employed by the Licensee or applied for 
employment with the Licensee . . . .”96 
Consider the effects of this broadcast contract. First, the promise not to 
discriminate should be legally binding as a bargained-for contractual 
agreement: there is offer and acceptance and the employer exchanges a 
legal detriment (the promise not to discriminate) for a legal benefit (the FE 
mark). One might question the adequacy of consideration for the FE mark, 
but there is intangible value here, and a court is extremely unlikely to strike 
down the deal for inadequacy.97 
One might also query whether this deal comprises bargained-for 
exchange as required under a consideration theory.98 A judge may doubt 
that the employer really sought to trade for the FE mark, concluding instead 
that this is simply a pretense allowing the employer to make a unilateral gift 
promise not to discriminate.99 If so, the entire deal unravels. The much more 
likely result, however, would be a judicial reluctance to wade into these 
waters. We can understand why an employer might really wish to obtain the 
FE trademark, and certainly Ayres and Brown would be unwilling to 
license the mark without receiving a reciprocal commitment from the 
employer not to discriminate.100 The bargain seems genuine and not a sham 
transaction. 
 
94  Ayres & Brown, supra note 93, at 1644–45. 
95  Id. at 1698. 
96  Id. at 1645. 
97  Indeed, some trademarks are understood to be highly valuable and it is entirely possible that 
displaying the FE mark could have real effects. 
98  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). 
99  Cf. id. § 71 illus. 5 (“A desires to make a binding promise to give $1000 to his son B. Being 
advised that a gratuitous promise is not binding, A offers to buy from B for $1000 a book worth less 
than $1. B accepts the offer knowing that the purchase of the book is a mere pretense. There is no 
consideration for A’s promise to pay $1000.”). 
100  Professor Ayres has even admitted elsewhere to negotiating with a potential consulting client to 
have them license the FE mark in exchange for his expert witness services. See Ian Ayres, Never Say 
No: The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Counteroffers, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 603, 615–
16 (2010). 
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Is this broadcast contract necessary? Conceivably, an employer who is 
committed to an antidiscrimination policy could write direct employment 
contracts with every new hire, under which it promises not to discriminate 
or promises to behave as if all aspects of ENDA were current law. These 
agreements would be valid, as bargained-for consideration is present in 
each contract (both the employer and employee exchange legal detriments), 
and any current employee facing such discrimination would be entitled to 
sue.101 But this is not the only audience for an employer’s promise. 
The real innovation in a broadcast contract arises from an ability to 
commit to parties outside of contractual privity and to parties that may 
otherwise never enter into a contractual relationship—in this case, potential 
employees.102 Prior to the execution of an employment contract, these 
applicants enjoy no direct contractual rights with the employer. They 
therefore lack an ability to enforce direct promises not to discriminate. The 
employer could conceivably sign a pre-employment contract, under which it 
promises not to discriminate in exchange for a promise to apply for 
employment. But that is exceedingly cumbersome and impractical. And 
even this may fall short of the true goal: an employer may seek to broadcast 
its commitment widely in order to attract potential employees or obtain 
some other anticipated benefit.103 
When a promise is broadcast via the FE contract, the situation differs 
from the use of repeated bilateral contracts. Each applicant is not, of course, 
named personally as a third-party beneficiary. But by clearly defining the 
classes of third-party beneficiaries to include job applicants and anyone else 
entitled to sue under ENDA, Ayres and Brown have provided a legal 
framework where candidates facing discrimination will undoubtedly be 
entitled to maintain a lawsuit as intended beneficiaries.104 This result would 
not be possible if the employer merely issued a unilateral promise or 
statement not to discriminate against future job applicants.105 
 
101  As I will discuss infra Part III.A.2, the transaction costs of writing multiple employment 
contracts would undoubtedly be greater than using a broadcast contract—especially if incoming 
employees felt the need to read and understand (and maybe even renegotiate) these various provisions. 
This should be true even if the employer uses a standard form contract to reduce costs. 
102  It is also possible, of course, that this binding precommitment will impact relationships with 
other, more remote stakeholders such as customers, competitors, and suppliers. See infra Part II.C. 
103  Again, it is possible that the employer could announce broadly that it always signs employment 
contracts with new hires prohibiting discrimination. This might indeed help foster a reputation that 
benefits the firm’s relationships with job applicants and other stakeholders. But the statement is still 
nonbinding and therefore exposed to discounting as “cheap talk” in a way that broadcast contracting is 
not. 
104  Ayres & Brown, supra note 93, at 1646. 
105  Barring a reliance theory, this unilateral promise would be understood by contract law as an 
unenforceable gift promise. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, “Law &” Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 881, 882–83 (“Absent [a few minor] exceptions, a gratuitous promise will not be enforced, even 
if it is indisputable that its maker well considered and seriously intended it.”). 
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In order to judge the effectiveness of broadcast contracting, we also 
need to ask how these contracts can be terminated. After an employer 
commits to this expanded legal regime, is the commitment irrevocable or 
can it be reversed if, say, the employer regrets its decision (perhaps because 
it begins to experience a rash of lawsuits that it suspects are illegitimate 
claims)? In the FE example, Ayres and Brown provide for trouble-free exit 
rights: an employer is free to cancel its contract at any time, though 
employees with legitimate claims prior to cancellation would still maintain 
their right to sue.106 Most likely, this flexibility was adopted to convince 
more employers to license the mark.107 But an easy exit obviously weakens 
the strength of commitment, as an applicant or other outsider might 
question whether the deal remains valid.108 Other exit regimes could easily 
be established, however, such as an agreement that lasts several years with 
automatic annual renewal rights unless one side files notice of termination 
with the other. Conceivably, a party might also establish a very long-term 
agreement, though a subsequent modification eroding these rights, if 
effective in limiting third-party claims, might again throw the continued 
validity of the commitment into question.109 
B. Some Other Applications 
It should be easy to see how anyone who identifies the potential to gain 
from a binding multilateral commitment might seize upon a broadcast 
contracting strategy to handcuff himself to new laws or obligations. 
Contract law is a flexible tool, long celebrated for the authority that it 
confers on two parties to establish private legal duties by voluntary 
agreement.110 The insight here, however, is that broadcast contracting 
provides parties with an easy way to go even further. Anyone can create 
what is essentially a private statutory regime, with very expansive 
enforcement rights (consider a deal designating the “world as my third-
party beneficiary”) or much narrower segments of beneficiaries (“everyone 
on my block is a third-party beneficiary”). This dual customization, relating 
to both substantive commitment and domain of applicability, is very 
powerful. Consider a few additional possibilities. 
 
106  Ayres & Brown, supra note 93, at 1656. 
107  Id. 
108  Presumably, Ayres and Brown or a third party could play an information aggregation role here 
by posting a current list of participants. Alternatively, a potential applicant could investigate whether the 
employer still displays the FE mark. 
109  Of course the initial counterparty would need to agree to a modification annulling third-party 
rights, and it is possible that it would not. Indeed, I strongly suspect that Ayres and Brown would say 
“no way” if asked to modify a long-term agreement in a way that eliminated all third-party rights. 
Moreover, it is possible to make an irrevocable commitment that is not subject to erosion via 
modification. See infra Part III.B.3. 
110  See Harry W. Jones, The Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 43, 50–54 (1975). 
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1. Tort.—Suppose that a manufacturer wants to convince a certain 
group of consumers that it produces a very high quality product. Tort law 
imposes certain obligations, of course, via strict product liability.111 And 
contract law, through Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
establishes certain warranties, such as the warranty of merchantability, 
unless the sales contract clearly disclaims these obligations.112 But these 
legal rights are subject to numerous limitations and qualifications, and it is 
at least conceivable that a manufacturer would wish to go further in an 
effort to signal quality. One option might be to expand the warranty terms 
in every individual sales contract. But a direct privity requirement may, in 
some cases, limit the protection afforded by the purchase contract—
especially if a manufacturer makes a component that will be incorporated 
into a more complicated product. A broadcast contract allows for greater 
flexibility. 
Imagine, for instance, that a chain saw manufacturer has developed a 
new type of “laser blade” that can melt through tree limbs. The innovator is 
concerned, however, that consumers will shy away from the laser blade due 
to fear of injury—after all, the laser blade technology is new and not all of 
the kinks have been worked out. We might expect that strict product 
liability will assuage some concerns because users know that they can 
recover damages for defective products.113 
Interestingly, however, North Carolina rejects strict liability for 
defective products.114 How can the laser blade maker convince consumers 
that its products are safe? One option might be to write a sales contract 
promising to indemnify purchasers for all injuries from the blade. But it 
may not want to go this far (especially if it fears liability for careless 
chainsaw users). Perhaps the seller simply wishes to provide North Carolina 
consumers with recovery rights along the lines of strict liability tort regimes 
in other states.115 
To accomplish this, the laser blade maker could write a broadcast 
contract with a willing counterparty under which it receives a certification 
mark (“safe” maker) in exchange for a promise that all North Carolina 
residents can recover for blade malfunctions as designated third-party 
 
111  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998). 
112  See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (2003) (describing express warranties, the implied 
warranty of merchantability, and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose). 
113  Of course the availability of strict liability for defective products might not fully eliminate 
concerns about the laser blade chain saw, as the laser could be working perfectly fine and still scare 
away potential consumers. 
114  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (2011) (“There shall be no strict liability in tort in product liability 
actions.”). 
115  It may be difficult to believe that any manufacturer would opt into greater tort liability, but such 
a commitment might, for example, allow the manufacturer to charge more via a bundled product–service 
pricing strategy. Alternatively, it might allow the manufacturer to increase the overall quantity of 
products sold, even if the individual profits per product are diminished. 
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beneficiaries to the extent that each consumer would enjoy recovery rights 
under the laws of South Carolina, which provides for strict liability where 
consumers are injured by defective products.116 Such an expanded legal 
obligation should be enforceable and binding on the manufacturer under the 
logic discussed above in the fair employment context.117 
Moreover, the ability to tailor the domain of commitment is an 
important feature of broadcast contracting. If our laser blade maker wants to 
commit, but is especially worried about illegitimate lawsuits from 
consumers in a certain county of North Carolina, then citizens of that 
county could presumably be excluded from the class of intended 
beneficiaries such that they would only enjoy the baseline tort rights 
provided by state law.118 Similarly, an employer interested in conferring 
ENDA protections on existing employees, but not on all job applicants, 
might limit the scope of their class of intended beneficiaries accordingly.119 
Because this framework is used to expand rights beyond existing laws, 
courts should not, without more,120 object to offers of incremental 
obligations to certain limited groups. 
2. Executive Compensation.—Consider an example related to 
corporate law. The topic of executive compensation has received a great 
deal of attention in recent years as the gap continues to grow between 
median employee salary and senior executive pay.121 One complicating 
factor is the delay between the receipt of executive compensation and the 
eventual consequences of decisions made during this period. The obvious 
problem is that it takes time to determine whether investments will pay off 
or wither on the vine. Some analysts fear that this delay allows managers to 
make poor decisions while simultaneously reaping large paychecks. In 
response, companies have begun to use clawback provisions in their 
 
116  See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (2005). 
117  An interesting wrinkle might arise if a court concluded that this attempt was inconsistent with 
the North Carolina statute, which says, after all, that “[t]here shall be no strict liability.” N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 99B-1.1 (emphasis added). If so, then the broadcast rights might be annulled under the logic 
described infra Part II.E. Arguably, however, the manufacturer itself should be entitled to opt into a 
higher liability standard if it so desires. 
118  To be sure, tailored legal rights could also be established in this context via direct warranty 
provisions in the purchasing contracts. Consumers in one county could receive an expansive warranty 
while consumers in another county receive a limited warranty. The effectiveness of broadcast 
contracting, then, may come down to a question of transaction cost minimization: Is it easier to write 
one broadcast contract that delineates the precise allocation of consumer protections, or is it easier to 
stuff the right warranty in the right box? The choice may also come down to questions about effective 
communication of the entitlements. 
119  This assumes that the employer does not operate in a state, county, or city that has enacted laws 
similar to ENDA. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
120  There are, of course, limits on the freedom to discriminate in contracting with respect to certain 
protected groups. 
121  See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
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employment contracts, under which the firm can recoup an executive’s 
salary or bonus payments if bad news emerges several years in the future. 
Some commentators have called for state or federal regulation in this area to 
break lingering agency-cost barriers to these contracting techniques or to 
standardize the way that clawback provisions operate.122 
Interestingly, however, it would be fairly easy for private clawback 
legislation to be promulgated via a broadcast contract. Any firm wishing to 
commit to such a regime could write a contract with a willing counterparty 
designating the firm as a “Meritocratic Employer” (ME). The firm could 
again receive use of a certification mark and the terms of the contract could 
establish the specific rules that the firm agreed to follow to implement the 
clawbacks—how long, which employees, what triggers for recoupment, 
what percentage of pay, and so on. Most importantly, the contract could 
designate third-party enforcement rights for various segments of owners 
and stakeholders—shareholders, debt investors, certain employees, and 
potentially others—giving any of these parties enforcement rights for a 
subsequent breach.123 Finally, the term of the broadcast contract could last 
for several years, committing the firm to clawbacks in advance of 
subsequent executive hires. It is this latter feature that might conceivably 
provide some advantages over a simple press release that all senior hires 
will be subject to clawback provisions in the future (which should be 
discounted as cheap talk). 
3. Corporate Social Responsibility.—In order to broadcast a contract, 
a promisor needs to locate a willing counterparty—someone like Ayres and 
Brown in the Fair Employment example124—who is willing to establish the 
substance of the third-party commitment (whether directly or by external 
reference) and to provide the consideration necessary to seal the deal (such 
as use of a certification mark or some other benefit). It is not necessary for 
this counterparty to retain monitoring and enforcement rights as long as an 
aggrieved third party will find it in her self-interest to take action for 
noncompliance. It is certainly possible, however, for the direct counterparty 
to keep an enforcement role. The possibilities here can be illustrated with a 
second example from corporate law. 
In recent years, the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has 
generated attention as an alternative to a corporate directive of shareholder 
 
122  See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an 
Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368 (2009) (describing 
and analyzing various clawback provisions). 
123  One complicating factor in the corporate context is the fact that any damage claims against the 
firm may ultimately be borne by the investors, including current shareholders and debt investors. 
Accordingly, it may be necessary to include other signatories to the initial broadcast contract—such as 
the board of directors, managers, or outside insurers—to provide the right incentives against breach. 
Such provisions could conceivably raise other corporate law and governance concerns. 
124  See supra notes 93–100 and accompanying text. 
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wealth maximization.125 CSR, in a nutshell, strives to balance the impact of 
corporate activity by managing a firm for the benefit of the environment, 
employees, communities, or some other relevant stakeholder.126 This can be 
a nebulous concept, but various groups have composed standards of CSR to 
spell out some general principles.127 A few states are even beginning to 
establish statutory frameworks that provide firms seeking to pursue CSR 
with a new set of default rules for governing corporate activity.128 Might 
broadcast contracting be another way for a firm to commit to these goals? 
Given the widespread interest in this topic, it should be easy for a firm 
wishing to pursue a policy of CSR to find a party to countersign the 
broadcast contract. To take just one possibility, a nonprofit company named 
B Lab currently registers companies as a benefit corporation (B 
Corporations) if they are willing to complete a number of requirements 
related to the pursuit of CSR (and pay the appropriate fees to B Lab). Upon 






Unlike Ayres and Brown, however, B Lab is not willing to relinquish 
all enforcement rights; rather, it seeks to directly monitor compliance with 
the terms of its license. One-fifth of all B Corporations, for example, are 
 
125  See, e.g., John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory 
Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1 (2005); David 
Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523 (2011). 
126  See, e.g., Geoffrey Heal, Corporate Social Responsibility—An Economic and Financial 
Framework 12–13 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=642762 (defining CSR). 
127  See, e.g., ISO 26000—Social Responsibility, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/social_responsibility (last visited Aug. 8, 2012) (providing an overview of ISO 
26000:2010, a guide on social responsibility aimed at international public and private organizations). 
128  Maryland, for example, has enacted legislation for “benefit corporations,” which offer a 
“material, positive impact on society and the environment, as measured by a third-party standard, 
through activities that promote a combination of specific public benefits.” MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). It goes on to list seven possibilities for specific public 
benefits: 
(1) Providing individuals or communities with beneficial products or services; 
(2) Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in 
the normal course of business; 
(3) Preserving the environment; 
(4) Improving human health; 
(5) Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge; 
(6) Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose; or 
(7) The accomplishment of any other particular benefit for society or the environment.  
Id. § 5-6C-01(d). 
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subject to on-site audits by B Lab during the two-year term of the 
agreement.129 But there is no reason why B Lab could not also extend third-
party enforcement rights to outsiders to enhance this commitment as long as 
the obligations and beneficiaries are clearly defined. A firm could sign an 
agreement with B Lab, for example, committing to certain environmental 
standards (above legal minimums)—and designating that any adversely 
affected party (perhaps as defined by some objective criteria) within, say, 
twenty miles of their facility could sue for breach as a third-party 
beneficiary. B Lab might also retain enforcement rights. It remains 
debatable whether a firm is better off committing to a policy of CSR,130 but 
the tools for a binding multilateral commitment are available. 
4. Other Domains.—These examples only scratch the surface of 
potential broadcast contracting scenarios. Because contract law supports so 
many different types of human activity, the domain of applicability is 
extensive. In property law, for instance, residents might amend a 
homeowners’-association agreement or some other covenant that runs with 
the land to include broadcast contracting rights. A property owner could 
commit to limit some use of her land by signing an agreement with a 
conservation group under which nearby residents are named as third-party 
beneficiaries. A party might commit to heightened rules of civil procedure, 
to the extent permitted by public policy,131 under a broadcast contract for an 
alternative system of procedure. Indeed, private parties might establish new 
commitments in any corner of activity that is supported by, or connected to, 
contract law. 
Of course, broadcast contracting only works if a promisor finds it in 
her self-interest to accede to the heightened commitment. The firm that, 
despite all rhetoric to the contrary, loves writing unconditional seven-figure 
checks to executives in the corner office will never broadcast a clawback 
commitment. The chain saw maker who dreads tort claims will laugh at the 
strategist who counsels opting into a stricter regime of liability. The 
ultimate question, then, is how a party might derive incremental benefits 
 
129  See Become a B Corp, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-Corp (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2012). 
130  One risk might be the possibility that CSR standards are drafted broadly, exposing the firm to 
lawsuits from many disaffected members of a community. The firm might also be placed in a situation 
where any decision about where to deploy scarce resources triggers a complaint by a party with 
competing interests. 
131  Arbitration clauses represent the front lines of permissible contractual modification of civil 
procedure. Extreme clauses can be struck down under the unconscionability doctrine, though the 
possibility of federal statutory preemption complicates the analysis. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743 (2011); Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 
788 (9th Cir. 2002) (striking down an arbitration clause). Recent scholarship in this area has focused on 
the broader implications of other types of procedural contracting. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Helen 
Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507 (2011); Jaime Dodge, The Limits 
of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723 (2011). 
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from an ability to commit broadly to future obligations or limits on 
behavior.132 This is a vast topic for strategists, but it is worth spending some 
time on the theoretical benefits of multilateral commitment in order to 
illustrate why anyone would agree to a broadcast contract. 
C. The Benefits of Multilateral Commitment 
The conventional wisdom says that preserving your options is a good 
idea. Don’t close doors prematurely. Defer decisions until absolutely 
necessary. And, indeed, there are indisputable benefits from maintaining the 
flexibility to take advantage of new information by altering malleable 
courses of action.133 This is why many firms and individuals shun 
commitment and delay decisions as long as possible, seeking to preserve 
flexibility as a means of coping with an uncertain world. 
But there can also be significant strategic advantage to reducing 
flexibility via commitment and the inexorable tying of one’s hands. 
Limiting your freedom can change other people’s expectations about your 
future behavior, and this, in turn, can accrue to your advantage. The 
intuition should be familiar; we have heard the stories about Odysseus 
lashed to the mast or the invading conqueror burning his ships upon 
landing.134 
A stylized example, borrowed from the game theory literature on this 
topic,135 should illustrate the benefits of broad-based, ex ante commitment. 
Imagine that you run Ford Motor Company and are locked in competition 
with your archrival, General Motors (GM). The latest issue relates to the 
length of your warranty. Each firm is considering a strategy that would 
extend the standard three-year warranty on every car to five years. GM has 
a better track record for automotive quality, however, so you fear that it 
would be able to implement such a change more easily than Ford. 
 
132  Ayres and Brown address this question of why parties might sign up for additional liability 
exposure in the employment context. See Ayres & Brown, supra note 93, at 1669–88. 
133  These benefits are discussed in the literature assessing real (or embedded) options. These are 
created implicitly when valuable opportunities—but, importantly, not obligations—to take action in the 
future arise from outcomes that are uncertain today. See JOHNATHAN MUN, REAL OPTIONS ANALYSIS: 
TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR VALUING STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS AND DECISIONS (2d ed. 2006); 
Timothy A. Luehrman, Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 
89. Many legal entitlements might be understood to contain real options. See, e.g., Bradford Cornell, The 
Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 175 (1990) (modeling discovery 
as a real option); Scott & Triantis, supra note 52 (describing the right to breach a contract and pay 
damages as a real option). 
134  Some of the benefits of using binding constraints as a means of strategic advantage are famously 
pioneered by the Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling. See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, Altruism, 
Meanness, and Other Potentially Strategic Behaviors, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 229 (1978). 
135  See, e.g., AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE 
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 120–24 (1991). 
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In the absence of a broadcast commitment, Ford and GM will 
simultaneously choose and announce their strategies—whether to offer the 
three- or five-year warranty. Each firm would like an outcome where it 
offers the five-year warranty and its competitor sticks with the three-year 
warranty, as this gives them a distinct advantage when marketing the cars to 
consumers.136 The worst outcome, however, arises when both firms offer the 
five-year warranty; both companies incur the incremental costs of the 
warranty without securing a relative marketing advantage. We can model 
this as the simultaneous form game illustrated in Figure 1.137 
FIGURE 1: SIMULTANEOUS WARRANTY DECISION (PAYOFFS TO FORD, GM) 
 GENERAL MOTORS WARRANTY 
FORD WARRANTY 3 YEARS 5 YEARS 
3 years 4, 3 2, 4 
5 years 3, 2 1, 1 
 
Note first that except for the worst outcome (5-year warranty, 5-year 
warranty) the payoffs are not symmetrical. In other words, this is not a 
prisoner’s dilemma game where both players are pushed, against their 
collective interests, into the longer term warranty. Rather, Ford’s ideal 
outcome (represented by the payoff of 4) arises when both competitors 
simply continue with the 3-year warranty. After that, Ford prefers the 
situation where it offers the longer warranty and GM does not (a payoff of 
3). This is followed by the third-best outcome (a payoff of 2) when Ford 
keeps the 3-year warranty, but GM offers 5 years. GM, on the other hand, 
has its best outcome when it offers the longer warranty and Ford does not. 
As stated above, GM can benefit more than Ford from a change in the status 
quo—but only if Ford does not match the change. After that, GM prefers 
the following results (respective): dual 3-year warranties (a payoff of 3); 
Ford offers 5 years and GM offers 3 years (a payoff of 2); and dual 5-year 
warranties (a payoff of 1). 
How will this game play out if we assume that each party has good 
information about the payoffs to both sides?138 As mentioned above, Ford 
 
136  This strategy was famously used in the automotive industry in the late 1990s when Hyundai 
Motor Company launched an aggressive marketing campaign that extended the warranties on its cars 
from the industry standard of three years to a much longer period of ten years in an effort to signal 
quality and win market share. 
137  The example is adapted from DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 135, at 121–22. 
138  Note that perfect information about the payoffs is not required; each party just needs to know the 
relative advantages of each outcome for its competitor. 
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prefers to maintain the status quo, but this will not occur with simultaneous 
decisionmaking. GM should see that no matter which alternative it chooses, 
Ford always does better by offering the 3-year warranty: Ford earns 4 > 3 
when GM offers 3 years, and Ford earns 2 > 1 when GM offers 5. 
Accordingly, GM should conclude that Ford is going to maintain its 3-year 
warranty policy no matter what. This, in turn, concentrates GM’s decision 
into a choice between offering the 5-year warranty for a payoff of 4 and 
offering the 3-year warranty for a payoff of 3. So GM will choose the 
former, and we should expect to see the outcome portrayed in the top right 
box of Figure 1: Ford announces 3 years for a payoff of 2, and GM 
announces 5 years for a payoff of 4. 
Now, consider how Ford can do better than this with a broadcast 
contracting strategy that commits it to offering the longer warranty. 
Suppose that Ford signs a contract with the consumer advocate Ralph Nader 
to license from Nader the right to display a “Ralph Nader Approved” 
(RNA) trademark on its advertising and marketing materials. In exchange 
for the use of this mark, Ford promises to offer a 5-year warranty on every 
car that it sells during the next 2 years. This agreement does not need to 
give Nader enforcement rights, but, like the FE contract described earlier,139 
it should specifically state that all Ford automobile purchasers in the United 
States during the term of the contract are designated as third-party 
beneficiaries, entitled to sue Ford for any breach of this agreement. 
Ford has, in short, used a broadcast contract to commit to the longer 
term warranty, and this will transform the competition with GM into the 
sequential game illustrated in Figure 2. Now Ford gets to go first, deciding 
whether to move to the top half (by doing nothing) or the bottom half 
(through the broadcast contract) of this game board. It will make this choice 
by reasoning backward, expecting that if it offers the 3-year warranty, then 
GM will offer the 5-year warranty (GM receives a payoff of 4 > 3). If, on 
the other hand, Ford chooses the 5-year warranty, GM should stick with a 
3-year warranty (2 > 1). Comparing the payoffs to Ford under either of 
these 2 options, Ford will decide to offer the 5-year warranty and receive a 
payoff of 3. 
In a nutshell, then, a credible upfront commitment allows Ford to 
transform a simultaneous standoff into a sequential game, and thereby 
increase its ultimate payoff from 2 to 3. To be sure, Ford would love to find 
a way to obtain a payoff of 4, but such a result is not possible in this game. 
 
139  See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
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Is broadcast contracting the best way for Ford to commit? Certainly it 
is not the only way. Ford might, for instance, seek to lock itself into the 
longer warranty simply by racing to announce a policy that all of its cars 
will be sold with 5-year warranties. This could indeed establish a degree of 
commitment, especially if everyone expects that backsliding on the 
announcement will cause significant harm to Ford’s reputation. But the ploy 
might also be dismissed as cheap talk by GM and prospective car buyers 
because Ford is legally free to change its mind prior to selling the cars. GM 
might simply make its own matching announcement, expecting that Ford 
will buckle under the pressure and reverse its statement, thereby moving the 
outcome back to the top right box of Figure 1. 
The advantage of a broadcast contract, then, is that Ford uses the 
power of the law to form an ironclad commitment. Just like a bilateral 
contract allows a given counterparty to rely on and invest in a promise, a 
broadcast contract allows potential customers and competitors to rest 
assured that the die has been cast. This changes the calculus by committing 
Ford to the longer warranty, and GM should be expected to adjust its own 
actions by maintaining the 3-year warranty in response to Ford’s 
commitment.140 Indeed, GM would love to beat Ford at its own game: if 
GM can broadcast its own contract for the 5-year warranty, then it gets to 
move first and can obtain GM’s first-best outcome.141 We can draw a nice 
analogy to a game of chicken where each side rushes to toss its steering 
wheel out the window first, thereby ensuring that its opponent will swerve. 
 
140  The key here is a credible commitment by Ford. If Ford has flexibility to switch back to the 3-
year warranty, then it will seek to do so after GM announces its 3-year warranty in order to obtain 
Ford’s maximum payoff of 4. But if GM sees that Ford’s promised warranty is not credible, GM will 
anticipate a change of mind by Ford and offer the 5-year warranty. 
141  GM picks the 5-year warranty and Ford, facing the choice between a payoff of 2 and a payoff of 
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D. Renegotiation 
It is helpful, in this context, to return to the topic of renegotiation. To 
establish meaningful commitment, the relevant players must not believe 
that it will be easy for a promisor to reverse his pledge by modifying away 
the third-party rights through renegotiation with the promisee. Continuing 
the example above, if Ford broadcasts a five-year warranty contract with a 
wholly owned subsidiary (Ford Assurance Company) as the counterparty 
(rather than with Ralph Nader), GM and potential purchasers may again 
dismiss the entire ploy as cheap talk. Everyone should expect that control 
over both counterparties frees Ford to renegotiate away all third-party rights 
as it sees fit and therefore GM may not hesitate to announce its own five-
year warranty. 
This scenario is obviously not in Ford’s interest, as it pressures Ford to 
return to the outcome portrayed by the top right quadrant of Figure 1. Ford 
would like to broadcast a commitment to third-party buyers that is not 
subject to erosion via renegotiation. There are at least two ways to seek this 
irrevocability. The first is to contract with a counterparty who will resist 
reversing the deal for reputational reasons. This is the role played by the 
hypothetical counterparty of Ralph Nader and the real-life example of 
Ayres and Brown. A promisor returning to these players to seek a 
renegotiation that undermines the third-party obligations would likely face a 
cool reception because each promisee is committed to supporting the 
protections granted to the third parties. But the commitment will only be as 
strong as outside expectations about a promisee’s unwillingness to 
backslide. 
A second possibility is to use the power of contract law to make such 
renegotiation impermissible (or at least subject to continuing damages for 
breach). As suggested earlier, courts have struggled over the years to 
determine whether third-party rights can be modified away.142 This is an 
especially thorny issue because there are legitimate reasons why two parties 
might wish to annul third-party rights as time passes. This must be 
balanced, however, against an understanding that, at the time of contracting, 
a promisor may really wish to commit irrevocably for the reasons described 
above. Accordingly, as I will argue in Part III of this Article,143 the initial 
presumption should be one of soft, or revocable, third-party rights in a 
broadcast contract. But the initial counterparties should also be entitled to 
change this default by manifesting a clear intention that the third-party 
rights are irrevocable for the term of the contract.144 This will allow a 
promisor to establish the binding legal commitment necessary to erase the 
 
142  See supra Part I.C. 
143  See infra Part III.B.3. 
144  Recall that this is also consistent with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311(2) (1981). 
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possibility that the specter of modification will damn the broadcast contract 
as cheap talk.145 
E. Reducing Obligations with Broadcast Contracts 
A final question that might arise is whether a motivated party can use a 
broadcast contract to reduce her legal obligations. Can a morally 
questionable firm whose motto is “do no good” write a broadcast contract 
that allows it to discriminate against any employee for any reason? Can a 
chain saw company broadcast an exculpatory agreement to the world, 
disclaiming all tort liability from defectively manufactured tools? The 
answer, of course, must be no. Most legal obligations are compulsory, and 
no amount of contracting should allow someone to wriggle out of these 
requirements.146 As a result, broadcast contracting is mostly a one-way 
ratchet, allowing parties to expand, but not reduce, their legal obligations. 
Any attempt to disclaim immutable laws should be ineffective; presumably, 
a judge would just strike the deal down for illegality or as inimical to public 
policy. 
But there is at least one caveat. In some cases, a party may be able to 
use third-party-beneficiary provisions to structurally limit the legal rights 
that third parties might otherwise enjoy in contract law. This is only true 
within certain limits, however, and the affected third parties must also 
accede to these structural limits when the relationship is formed. The easiest 
way to illustrate this idea is by examining bond offerings in the field of 
corporate finance. 
When a company issues bonds, the deal is not always structured as you 
might expect. The simplest arrangement would be to write a contract 
between the firm and the various investors where the latter promises to lend 
and the former promises to pay interest, repay the loan, and take on other 
various obligations to protect this promise to repay.147 But this is not how it 
often works in practice.148 Rather, the issuer signs a direct contract—the 
bond indenture—with a bond trustee (often a large commercial bank) 
setting out most of the legal and economic terms that will govern the bonds. 
The primary investors are simply named as third-party beneficiaries to this 
bond indenture (though each investor may also sign a very short, direct 
contract with the issuer).149 Similarly, all of the paperwork and funding is 
channeled through the trustee.150 
 
145  Such fears will also be tempered by the doctrine of reliance. Id. § 311(3). 
146  See, e.g., id. § 178. 
147  This includes promises like maintaining insurance, not selling key assets, and so on. 
148  See BRATTON, supra note 14, at 240–42. By contrast, private lending agreements are often 
structured as direct contracts between borrower and lenders. Id. at 245. 
149  Id. at 241. 
150  Id. 
106:1153  (2012) Broadcast Contracting 
 1185
Why would the parties structure their relationship in such a 
counterintuitive manner? What possible purpose could be served by 
interposing a distinct legal entity between the very direct relationship of 
borrower and lender? Certainly this is not some recent innovation designed 
to promote securitization or another form of financial engineering; the 
practice dates back to railroad financings and the earliest large-scale bond 
issues.151 Rather, the structure arose as a form of delegated monitoring: 
disparate bond investors were thought to lack resources and incentives to 
monitor the issuer’s financial condition.152 Instead, a trustee was appointed 
to watch the firm on the investor’s behalf and bring suit against the issuer in 
the event of missed interest payments or some other breach.153 
But this is hardly the whole story. Many bond indentures also contain 
provisions that channel lawsuits through the trustee. In some cases, a certain 
percentage of investors must object before the trustee is allowed to sue the 
issuer.154 In other cases, significant discretion remains with the trustee.155 
For example, if the firm breaches a financial ratio covenant in a given 
quarter—such as the promise to maintain a certain earnings-to-interest 
ratio—then a single bond investor may not be entitled to sue the company 
to force acceleration of the loan. Rather, the indenture may insist that a 
given percentage of investors (perhaps 50% by dollar amount) object to the 
breach before the trustee may initiate a lawsuit. This is thought to serve as a 
screening device to shield the issuing firm from frivolous or abusive strike 
suits by an insignificant bond investor. Indeed, there are reasons why most 
of the bond holders might prefer to waive a given covenant breach, 
especially if the problem is viewed as a technical or temporary concern. If 
so, the majority of investors might object to a small investor triggering 
acceleration and thus prefer the structural solution described above. 
Returning to our general question about the domain of broadcast 
contracting, we can see that the parties here have used a third-party-
beneficiary structure to limit the contractual enforcement rights that might 
have otherwise been provided to objecting investors with a direct contract. 
But note that the initial investor has to accede to this structure when 
purchasing the bonds; she is always free to reject these limits on her right to 
enforce a breach by investing money elsewhere. And there is nothing illegal 
about placing some limits on the right to sue for breach of contract; this 
 
151  In the railroad context, this also allowed the investors to obtain security for their loans without 
receiving an individual fractional interest in the assets of the firm. Later, the contractual framework was 
extended to unsecured bond offerings. 
152  See, e.g., Mitchell Berlin & Jan Loeys, Bond Covenants and Delegated Monitoring, 43 J. FIN. 
397, 398 (1988) (noting that investors with diversified portfolios have limited incentives to monitor, 
even when these efforts are valuable for a collective group of investors). 
153  Id. 
154  See BRATTON, supra note 14, at 240–41. 
155  Id. 
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happens all the time with arbitration clauses or tiered dispute resolution 
procedures that give a party time to “cure” some technical breach before a 
lawsuit can be initiated. In other words, a party seeking to restrict its 
obligations with broadcast contracting must still operate within the confines 
of immutable laws. Further, lawmakers are nervous about the possibility 
that contract law’s flexibility might be used to erode baseline legal rights, 
and they famously guard against this with doctrines such as 
unconscionability,156 illegality,157 and contracts that are deemed void for 
public policy reasons.158 Even in the bond-financing context, lawmakers 
have limited by statute the degree to which parties can place structural 
limits on an individual investor’s right to sue.159 
As this example illustrates, broadcast contracting should be seen 
mostly as a vehicle for expanding obligations. The power to reduce legal 
obligations is quite modest, and such a reduction cannot be performed 
unless the adversely affected parties are willing to play along (throwing into 
question whether we should even call these broadcast contracts). 
The final set of issues relates to the normative impact of broadcast 
contracting: the role that contract law should play in supporting multilateral 
commitment and third-party-beneficiary rights. The tradeoffs are 
complicated. The cynic might argue that expansive third-party rights will 
open the door to a new breed of wasteful strike suits, as the Hawkeye 
John’s of the world muster their lawyers. The optimist will counter that this 
is no different than other types of private ordering and that contract law 
should foster the use of broadcast contracting to support private gains. How 
should we think about these competing claims? And might the answer 
depend on the legal requirements for identifying and protecting valid third-
party commitments? Part III addresses these normative questions. 
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACT LAW 
Why should an outsider ever be permitted to sue on a contract that has 
been created by others? After all, a contract is conceived by two direct 
counterparties, even if it might impact the welfare of others, and the person 
who signs a deal is generally considered the proper party to bring an action 
for nonperformance. Indeed, very permissive third-party enforcement rights 
will distort the fundamental goals of contract law and undermine private 
 
156  See supra note 131. 
157  Contracts that violate an existing law are often struck down or reformed as impermissible. 
158  Direct exculpatory agreements are a good example here: some agreements are permitted, but 
promises not to pursue tort claims can be struck down as unenforceable in extreme situations. 
159  This discretion was thought to have been abused by bond trustees, leading to the enactment of 
the Trust Indenture Act (TIA) by Congress in 1939 and highly regulated bond indenture contracts with 
mandatory terms. For example, a bond contract subject to the TIA must allow investors to sue when 
principal payments are not made as promised. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-253, 53 
Stat. 1149 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa–bbbb (2006)). 
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ordering. I may be quite comfortable signing a contract with a single 
counterparty, for instance, knowing that I can stomach the risk of paying 
him expectation damages if I must breach. But I might not be willing to 
transact if my legal exposure expands to include the risk of incurring 
additional damage claims from many different outsiders. Unless I can 
charge a higher price or easily discard this heightened legal exposure, I may 
abandon positive surplus transactions. Given these risks of chilling valuable 
trade, can a legal rule permitting third-party rights ever be justified as 
promoting some other normative goal? 
The only way to answer this question is to set out a normative theory 
of contract law and then consider how the treatment of third-party 
beneficiaries relates to these fundamental goals. I take an approach 
grounded in the economic analysis of law. At the macro level, contract law 
should promote the voluntary transfer of resources to their highest value 
users with a minimum of transaction costs (broadly defined).160 More 
specifically, the law should seek to encourage both efficient trade (the 
transfer of goods and services from lower value to higher value users) and 
efficient reliance (customized investment that allows parties to increase the 
anticipated payoffs from trade).161 At the micro level, this usually means 
that the law should attempt to understand and preserve (or at least not 
distort) the careful balance of economic incentives established in any given 
transaction.162 In other words, we should also seek laws that minimize 
judicial error. 
There are other lenses for evaluating contract law, of course, but law 
and economics scholars have drawn upon these guiding principles to 
develop numerous insights related to the proper (and improper) mechanics 
of contract law.163 Most of the work here, however, analyzes direct 
exchange relationships between two contracting parties; much less has been 
said about how these goals relate to the legal treatment of outsiders. Thus, a 
comprehensive assessment of third-party rights requires inquiry into the 
sources of private gain from broadcast contracting, the transaction costs 
incurred in the pursuit of this gain, and the possibility of judicial error. 
 
160  See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1581, 1583 (2005). 
161  See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 52, at 290–91; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 52, at 544–
45. For a more formal model exploring the efficient investment decision, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, 
Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & ECON. 691 (1983). 
162  See, e.g., VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (2006) 
(describing the economic effects of selected contract provisions, along with some questionable legal 
outcomes altering these anticipated effects). 
163  To be sure, the task is not easy, and it is not always clear how the macro goals can be translated 
into legal rules that provide micro guidance to judges. See George S. Geis, Economics as Context for 
Contract Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 597–99 (2008) (discussing the challenges of translating between 
the macro and micro goals of contract law); Posner, supra note 54, at 864–65 (discussing indeterminacy 
concerns with the economic analysis of contract law). 
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I will divide the inquiry into two distinct questions. First, should 
contract law even allow parties to write broadcast contracts? If, as I will 
argue, the answer is yes, then we come to question two: how should judges 
determine whether a given third-party claim is valid? In other words, what 
default rule should be adopted for third-party enforcement rights, and what 
should it take for a promisor and promisee to modify this default? 
A. In Defense of Broadcast Contracting 
1. Maximizing Private Gains.—As a gateway issue we need to decide 
whether the ability to arm outsiders with a right to obtain damages for 
breach should even be permitted by contract law. We generally allow 
parties to contract about almost anything, under the mantra “freedom of 
contract,” so the presumption here might be one of tolerance.164 But some 
contexts are off limits. The law refuses to enforce contracts for illegal 
activity, for example, and some otherwise unobjectionable terms are struck 
down as violations of public policy.165 Should we enact a similar ban on the 
conferral of third-party rights? 
I would argue that contract law should continue to allow willing parties 
to broadcast rights to outside beneficiaries. As discussed above, there are 
legitimate reasons why the initial counterparties might wish these rights to 
attach. A promisor may seek to tie her hands to signal an incremental 
commitment broadly and thereby gain new customers, better employees, 
fewer competitors, or some other strategic benefit. Similarly, the promisee 
to a broadcast contract may realize private gains. In some cases, this may 
come in the form of intangible satisfaction, arising with the knowledge that 
the promisor has locked herself into a desired commitment with outsiders.166 
In other cases, the benefit to a promisee may be more direct. For example, a 
promisee licensing use of a certification mark as part of a broadcast 
contract167 may seek a critical mass of users in order to boost the value and 
visibility of that certification. A blanket prohibition on third-party-
beneficiary rights will smother these types of legitimate private gains. 
Moreover, the ability to write binding broadcast contracts also supports 
relation-specific investment—potentially by both the initial counterparties 
and the third-party beneficiaries—to further increase the collective gains.168 
Using an example of buyer investment, Richard Craswell offers this helpful 
definition of relation-specific investment for bilateral contracts: “[I]t is any 
choice, be it action or inaction, which will (1) make [seller’s] performance 
 
164  See Jones, supra note 110, at 49. 
165  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). 
166  The employer looking to provide expanded rights to employees or the manufacturer who feels 
good about standing behind a quality product might be examples of this. 
167  See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
168  On the topic of relation-specific investment, see sources cited supra note 161. 
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more valuable to [buyer] if [seller] does in fact perform, but (2) make 
[buyer] worse off than if he had not relied if [seller] fails to perform.”169 
This same definition can easily be extended to broadcast contracts. Direct 
counterparties may seek to take some action (or inaction) in reliance on the 
enforcement rights of a third party to increase the gains from trade. 
Similarly, the third-party beneficiaries of a broadcast contract might profit 
by making a relation-specific investment on a broadcast contract. The future 
purchaser of a Ford car, for example, may be able to take certain actions or 
inactions in reliance on a promised five-year warranty to further increase 
the value she obtains from the upcoming trade. A consumer might buy an 
accessory that only works with Fords. A corporate purchaser may 
standardize its fleet of cars to reduce maintenance costs. Failure to enforce 
the outsider claims would undermine this investment, however, and thereby 
stymie the amplified economic gains.170 
It is important to recognize, however, that these private gains can 
theoretically be obtained through the use of many repeated bilateral 
contracts. To a great extent, then, the availability of broadcast contracting 
should be understood as a device for minimizing the transaction costs of 
exchange—a fundamental goal of economic efficiency. 
2. Minimizing Transaction Costs.—In a Coasean world of zero 
transaction costs,171 the law of third-party-beneficiary contracting should not 
matter a jot. If lawmakers refused to allow a promisor to convey 
enforcement rights to third parties, then that promisor could theoretically 
write bilateral contracts with every affected person. Someone wishing to 
broadcast a commitment to a new employment policy, for example, would 
sign contracts with every employee, job applicant, and other conceivable 
beneficiary.172 
Similarly, if we assume zero litigation costs—a form of transaction 
costs in the contracting context173—then it would be effortless for a 
promisee to enforce obligations that provide some benefit to a third party. 
Each promisee should be willing to sue on behalf of the injured third party 
because it would cost the promisee nothing. Accordingly, while we might 
 
169  Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 490 (1996). 
170  As with bilateral contracts, a lack of enforcement should chill relation-specific investment by the 
third parties out of a fear that the investment would be subject to holdup demands by the promisor. See 
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 52, at 559–62. 
171  See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
172  This assumes that no consideration problems would arise because the individual counterparties 
would be able to offer some reciprocal promise, such as a willingness to apply for a job or purchase a 
product. Unilateral gift promises to many different third parties would, of course, be unenforceable 
under existing contract doctrine. See Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 416–17 (1977). 
173  In contract law, litigation over the meaning of a contract can be understood as a form of back-
end transaction cost. See Posner, supra note 160, at 1583 (describing transaction costs in the contracting 
context as the sum of upfront drafting costs and back-end litigation costs). 
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still observe third-party beneficiaries in this hypothetical world, there would 
be little need for out-of-privity enforcement rights. 
Reversing the legal rule would lead to identical results under these 
same Coasean assumptions. We might adopt a law, for instance, where any 
adversely affected person could, by default, successfully recover third-party 
damages for breach. But with zero drafting costs, the initial counterparties 
could easily scope their contract to exclude rights for remote outsiders and 
thereby narrow this default. Similarly, with zero litigation costs, each initial 
counterparty would not need to worry about defending against illegitimate 
claims (from, say, parties who did not actually incur damages under this 
expansive regime). 
We do not live in this frictionless world, of course, and relaxing the 
Coasean perspective allows us to observe the role that third-party 
enforcement rights might play in driving down the costs of obtaining 
private gains from multilateral commitment. Commentators now recognize 
two types of transaction costs in the contracting context: ex ante drafting 
costs and ex post litigation costs over the meaning of a contractual 
commitment.174 In a system with positive transaction costs, the choice 
between these two alternatives matters. Parties will not take the time to 
spell out every possible contingency in an initial contract, even though such 
efforts might allow them to avoid future litigation over differing 
interpretations of their agreement.175 Drafting fees would eat up the gains 
from trade, and it is far cheaper, from an expected value point of view, to 
litigate the treatment of these low probability events if the unexpected 
occurs. 
On the other hand, parties will typically include the most critical 
provision in the upfront agreement. They will not, for example, strike a 
bare-bones deal to “sell the company” while leaving the price, timing, and 
other key terms subject to judicial interpretation over how to best 
implement the commitment.176 Accordingly, we should expect contracting 
parties to balance one type of transaction cost against the other, taking the 
time to draft provisions for fundamental terms but ignoring less important 
terms or remote contingencies in the initial agreement.177 
We should consider the effects on both types of transaction costs, then, 
when weighing the merits of broadcast contracting. The savings related to 
upfront drafting and negotiation should be obvious. A legal system that 
 
174  Id. 
175  See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 53 (discussing the gap-filling problem with incomplete 
contracts); Cohen, supra note 53 (same). 
176  Indeed, in the extreme, such an effort would be fruitless. Courts are also only willing to go so far 
to adjudicate ambiguities for contracting parties, and a judge will toss out the contract entirely under the 
indefiniteness doctrine if the parties leave too much out. See sources cited infra note 185. 
177  Posner, supra note 160, at 1583. We might also predict the adoption of standard boilerplate 
terms in some contexts because the transaction costs of including these provisions should be lower. 
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permits broadcast contracting enables parties to write a single contract that 
confers rights to many. This replaces the need to negotiate and draft 
numerous bilateral contracts between a promisor and beneficiary. Even in 
an age of form contracting and take-it-or-leave-it negotiations,178 it takes far 
less time to establish one commitment versus one thousand.179 
Unlike the obvious efficiency gains, the impact of broadcast 
contracting on ex post litigation costs is not so clear. Forcing a promisor to 
write direct contracts with every beneficiary (by rejecting the doctrine of 
third-party-beneficiary rights) might indeed cut litigation expenses relating 
to the identification of intended beneficiaries. But some litigation will 
persist; we cannot expect the promisor and the beneficiary to reduce all 
performance obligations to writing. So a degree of ex post litigation over 
the substance of these rights would continue, even with many bilateral 
contracts. 
By comparison, a regime that permits third-party claims in some 
circumstances will likely see a systemic increase in litigation costs because 
an additional gateway issue may now need to be litigated: whether a given 
plaintiff falls within the entitled class of beneficiaries. Conceivably, a 
promisor will be forced to defend against numerous borderline lawsuits, and 
this concern becomes especially important as we move from bilateral to 
multilateral contracting. Only one party will sue you in a bilateral contract 
dispute; with third-party rights, a flood of lawsuits might arise. Moreover, 
there is a feedback loop: the availability of third-party rights might drive ex 
ante transaction costs up further, as the initial counterparties are forced to 
spend resources defining and limiting the contours of third-party rights. 
How should we weigh these tradeoffs? While the best approach is 
ultimately an empirical question, I would contend that denying third-party 
enforcement rights altogether is likely suboptimal. The transaction costs of 
requiring bilateral agreements with all beneficiaries will often be significant 
and frequently impracticable. For this reason, an insistence on bilateral 
contracting would likely eradicate some of the private gains from 
multilateral commitment. 
If we accept this gateway premise—that outside enforcement rights are 
normatively desirable in a system of contract law—then we arrive at the 
second crucial question: what should be required to establish a valid third-
 
178  See, e.g., Mark R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition and 
Contract Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327 (2010) (discussing contract standardization and 
proposing regulatory approaches to standardized contracts). 
179  Furthermore, it may not be practical for a party wishing the benefits of a broadcast contract to 
sign individual agreements with all potentially impacted parties, especially if they are not aware of the 
exact identity of a contingent class of beneficiaries. Imagine, for example, writing a contract that 
identifies by name and social security number all purchasers of Ford automobiles in the next two years 
as beneficiaries. The identity of these buyers is not knowable, and they must be described as a class, if at 
all, even though the ambiguity might lead to an interpretation dispute. 
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party claim? Or said differently, what default rule with respect to the 
broadcasting of third-party rights will minimize the cost function of ex ante 
drafting efforts, ex post litigation expenses, and judicial error? And what 
should it take for parties seeking alternative legal treatment to adjust this 
default? 
B. Identifying Valid Third-Party Claims 
The task of identifying whether outside claims should attach to any 
given contract can be seen as a problem of contract interpretation. Just as a 
court might be asked to determine whether two parties meant to trade a 
certain grade of chicken,180 or whether delivery of this chicken should come 
in one lot or several lots, a court may need to work out whether an 
agreement should be understood to confer valid third-party claims. The law 
can impose default rules to help resolve some interpretative disputes.181 But 
these can only go so far because contractual activity is varied and 
lawmakers cannot plan for every ambiguity in advance. Accordingly, a 
judge may need to fall back on various approaches and maxims, including 
textualism, an assessment of prior dealings, the determination of generally 
accepted trade customs, and, ultimately, evidence (and perhaps conjecture) 
about the contractual intent of the parties.182 
From an interpretive point of view, there is nothing special about third-
party-beneficiary rights; the presence of outside enforcement power in any 
given contract should simply be understood as an additional term that must 
be adjudicated. Does an agreement provide for third-party claims or not? As 
described in Part I, the typical approach to the identification of third-party 
rights is grounded in a very general default standard—that of intended 
versus incidental beneficiary. Importantly, an intended beneficiary has 
historically been found to exist without explicit textual acknowledgement of 
this right in the initial agreement.183 In other words, outsiders may seize 
upon an agreement and argue that the initial counterparties sought to make 
them intended beneficiaries, even in the absence of formal statements to 
that effect. 
This accommodating standard of intended beneficiary by implication 
has one clear advantage over a formal rule requiring explicit documentation 
 
180  See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 
1960) (“The issue is, what is chicken?”). 
181  E.g., U.C.C. § 2-307 (2003) (providing a default rule that goods “must be tendered in a single 
delivery”). 
182  See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 498 (2004) (noting, and ultimately rejecting, the “all-things-considered” 
approach to contract analysis); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and 
Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1712–13 (1997) (outlining a hierarchy of factors that 
contribute to a contract gap-filling analysis). 
183  See supra Part I.B. 
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of third-party rights. A promisor and promisee will be able to reduce ex 
ante drafting costs by punting on the task of defining third-party rights and 
conscripting our legal system to backfill intent. 
But there is a very high cost to pay for this draftsman’s economy: the 
use of an abstract legal standard offers very little guidance to distinguish 
valid and invalid claims. Courts must shove plaintiffs into one box or 
another without help from the parties on how to sort the claimants. In short, 
legal treatment of this issue has been oversynthesized into a very general 
default standard that accepts the possibility of undocumented rights but 
provides little direction to parties and courts about when these rights will 
take effect. It should not be surprising that many potential plaintiffs 
recognize the option value, and perhaps the nuisance value, of initiating 
claims in this area.184 
1. Towards a Formal Default Rule.—In the place of our prevalent 
approach to third-party rights, I would advocate an alternative default rule: 
Third-party-beneficiary claims should be presumed invalid for indefiniteness 
unless the initial counterparties formally establish these rights in their 
agreement. 
In other words, the default rule for third-party rights should be off, not 
maybe. A promisor and promisee should be required to flip the switch on to 
legitimize outsider claims. 
Analogizing to the indefiniteness doctrine is helpful to justify this 
default rule. While courts will often work diligently to preserve an 
incomplete agreement via interpretation, there is a limit. When an important 
term is missing from the deal, a judge may simply toss out the agreement 
entirely for indefiniteness instead of attempting to patch together the 
contract with an interpretive ruling.185 This appears to be especially true 
when the parties could have easily spelled out the term, or at least a 
verifiable formula for giving content to the term, but fail to do so.186 
 
184  See supra note 9. 
185  See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 3.27; MURRAY, supra note 10, § 38; PERILLO, supra note 
10, § 2.9. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts the indefiniteness doctrine as follows: “Even 
though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as 
to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 33(1) (1981). The rule is justified as “reflect[ing] the fundamental policy that contracts 
should be made by the parties, not by the courts.” Id. § 33 cmt. b. 
186  See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1641, 1653–55 (2003) (suggesting that courts might be “focus[ing] on whether the parties have fully 
exploited verifiable information in concluding their agreements” when deciding whether to annul for 
indefiniteness). 
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Some commentators187 and lawmakers188 deride the indefiniteness 
doctrine because it annuls what otherwise appears to be a legitimate 
contractual exchange. A ruling of indefiniteness may result in real hardship, 
especially if one party has relied heavily on what it thought was a binding 
commitment. An employee, for example, may expend extra effort in 
reliance on his boss’s promise to pay him “a fair share of the profits,” only 
to find that this agreement is unenforceable.189 
But the indefiniteness doctrine is an important and legitimate escape 
valve for the interpretative task. Parties who leave fundamental terms 
unstated should not be able to externalize drafting costs on the judiciary.190 
Some gap filling must be tolerated in any effort to minimize systemic 
transaction costs.191 But there should be limits. An employer and employee 
should not be able to strike a bonus plan offering “a fair share of [the] 
profits” and leave it to the courts to figure out what this means.192 A TV 
producer promising to “take care of [a service provider] and remunerate 
[him] in a manner commensurate to the true value of [his services]” should 
not be understood as making a real legal commitment.193 If you want a 
binding contract, hammer out the key terms now. So the ongoing use of the 
indefiniteness doctrine should not be seen as problematic.194 
 
187  Support for active judicial gap filling takes root in both economic and philosophical approaches 
to contract law. The economic argument usually states that courts can save on transaction costs by filling 
gaps with commonly preferred terms. See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and 
the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 115, 116–18 (1993) (citing much of the literature 
on gap filling); Craswell, supra note 52, at 1–2; Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1006 (1992). But see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 53, at 93 (arguing that 
majoritarian gap filling is not necessarily the optimal economic approach). The philosophical argument 
for judicial gap filling suggests that respect for parties’ true intentions sometimes requires courts to 
resolve ambiguities. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 57–73 (1981). 
188  E.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2003) (“Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale 
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably 
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”). 
189  See, e.g., Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 823 (N.Y. 1916). 
190  The concern that parties may inappropriately shift contracting costs to the judiciary dates back at 
least to Lon Fuller’s work on formalities in contract law. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 
41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 805–06, 813 (1941). More recent views on this topic can be found in Ayres & 
Gertner, supra note 53, at 123–27; Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 571 (2006) (“[T]here is no doubt that in a simple economic model, the 
parties have an incentive to externalize their costs on courts. One way of doing so may be to leave gaps 
in their contracts in the expectation that courts will fill them properly in case there is a dispute.”). 
191  See Posner, supra note 160. 
192  Varney, 111 N.E. at 823. 
193  Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 614, 618–21 (3d Cir. 2004) (third alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
194  See Scott, supra note 186, at 1652–61 (empirically examining the frequency of indefiniteness 
rulings during the years 1998 to 2002). 
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The same values that motivate the indefiniteness doctrine are quite 
relevant to an assessment of broadcast contracting. When a third party 
insists that an agreement confers outside enforcement rights, but the 
agreement is silent about the existence of these rights, this claim presents 
concerns analogous to those of the indefiniteness doctrine. The initial 
counterparties might easily have specified that these rights were present; 
failure to do so should be viewed with suspicion. Moreover, an inquiry into 
the intent of the initial counterparties with respect to this term presents 
significant judicial burdens, and it is legitimate to question whether courts 
should be forced to take up this mantle. 
This is not to say that the entire contract should be annulled for 
indefiniteness. If the promisee wants to sue the promisor for breach, who 
cares if the agreement fails to mention third-party rights? But a claim for 
damages by a third party should be tossed out, by analogy to the 
indefiniteness doctrine, unless the initial parties make clear provisions to 
the contrary. This is such a fundamental term, with respect to the third-party 
claim, that the initial counterparties should be required to spell it out if they 
want these rights to attach. Indeed, this is likely the default rule that most 
contracting parties would prefer. Furthermore, this default should attach 
even when a third party would clearly benefit from the contemplated 
exchange—as in, for instance, the creditor– or donee–beneficiary context. 
There is an important analytical distinction between contracting for a 
benefit to an outsider and granting a right to sue for breach to that outsider. 
What should be sufficient to alter a default rule denying outsider 
rights? Certainly the parties should not be required to eliminate all 
ambiguities about the implementation of these rights. Just as other 
contractual language can satisfy indefiniteness concerns while continuing to 
raise interpretation issues, the exact contours of third-party rights might be 
resolved through adjudication. But the agreement should indicate explicitly, 
at a minimum, that outside rights will be available to certain parties, and it 
should provide a judge with a plausible formula or framework for 
determining whether a given outside litigant falls within this defined class. 
Otherwise, an outside claim should be rejected. 
How would this formal default rule impact the systemic transaction 
costs of contracting? With respect to upfront drafting and negotiation costs, 
the effects cut both ways. Insistence on some formal statement about third-
party beneficiaries may increase drafting costs for parties that do indeed 
wish to establish outside enforcement rights; they must now include this 
term instead of leaving it to the courts to grant third-party liability through a 
more accommodating default standard. But there might also be a net 
savings to parties who do not wish to convey outside rights but fear the 
possibility of such claims. With my proposed default, they would not need 
to include exculpatory language that disclaims third-party-beneficiary 
rights. Under the prevailing legal approach, these parties may feel a need to 
expend drafting efforts to ensure that outside claims will be invalidated. It is 
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difficult to determine how these effects would balance out; I suspect that 
they may roughly offset each other, but the question is empirical. 
The effect on back-end litigation costs may be more significant. As 
described above, there is a real likelihood that the current default standard 
requires some promisors to defend against third-party plaintiffs that the 
original contracting parties never anticipated or sanctioned. Hawkeye 
John’s should jump to mind,195 and many other lawsuits border on the 
egregious. In 2000, for example, boxing fans sued Mike Tyson for a refund 
of their ticket prices, claiming that they were third-party beneficiaries of 
Tyson’s boxing contract and that their right to see a “legitimate 
heavyweight title fight” was thwarted when Tyson was disqualified for 
biting his opponent’s ear.196 In 2002, the winner of the Miss North Carolina 
beauty pageant resigned after the state pageant became aware of revealing 
photos taken by her former boyfriend. She had a change of heart, however, 
and sued the Miss America Organization (MAO) when it refused to let her 
compete, claiming that she was a third-party beneficiary of the franchise 
contract between North Carolina and MAO.197 And in 2007, a prospective 
lottery player sued Speedway Super Convenience Store, claiming that the 
store’s refusal to sell him an Indiana lottery ticket amounted to a breach of 
the contract between the store and the state lottery commission. Further, the 
plaintiff claimed that he was protected as a third-party beneficiary of this 
contract and that he would have won the lottery, over $11 million, if only 
the damned store had sold him that ticket.198 The average year sees more 
than 100 published opinions,199 and while some of these complaints 
undoubtedly have merit, many more are dismissed as the long-shot claims 
of disgruntled boxing fans, beauty queens, and lottery aspirants. 
Adopting a default rule that requires an explicit grant of outsider rights 
would go a long way towards eliminating these specious lawsuits. Two 
counterparties who really do seek to commit broadly, such as those seeking 
the gains from broadcast contracting, can specifically establish these rights. 
And those wishing to avoid outside claims will be protected by the default. 
 
195  See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text. 
196  They lost. Castillo v. Tyson, 701 N.Y.S.2d 423, 424 (App. Div. 2000) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
197  She lost. See Revels v. Miss Am. Org., 641 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). The agreement did 
state that MAO would accept the winner of the North Carolina pageant as a contestant in the finals, but 
the court quickly concluded that there was no evidence supporting a conclusion that the contestant was 
an intended beneficiary. See id. at 724. For a detailed recounting of the facts of this case, see Revels v. 
Miss Am. Org., 599 S.E.2d 54, 56 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
198  He lost. See Andrews v. Speedway SuperAmerica LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1242-WTL-DML, 2010 
WL 2985938 (S.D. Ind. July 27, 2010). Apparently the plaintiff arrived at the store after 10:00 PM 
seeking to play his birthday numbers. The store’s policy was to not sell tickets after 10:00 PM, even 
though the state lottery commission permitted tickets to be sold until 10:40 PM. The plaintiff could not 
get to another store in time and was furious when that night’s winning draw matched his birthday. 
199  See supra note 9. 
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Again, the net effect on the transaction costs of exchange is ultimately an 
empirical question. But I would contend that an open-ended standard 
inviting many different types of outside claims is unlikely to be the optimal 
default. 
2. Costs of a Formalist Approach (and Some Mitigants).—I recognize 
that moving towards a formal default rule will potentially bypass some 
deserving claimants. Two counterparties who really do wish to convey 
third-party rights, but are unaware of this default, may have their 
unexpressed, but nevertheless real, intentions frustrated. Yet there are at 
least three responses. First, a promisee will always maintain enforcement 
rights and might still bring a lawsuit for breach on behalf of (and potentially 
with the financial support of) an aggrieved third party. In the donee–
beneficiary context, for instance, a promisee may seek specific 
performance. Or, in the alternative, the promisee may mitigate a promisor’s 
breach by hiring a substitute performer to provide the good or service to the 
third party and suing the promisor to recover this incremental outlay.200 
Second, an adversely impacted third party who reasonably relies on a 
promise or statement by the initial counterparties might be able to pursue a 
claim on the basis of promissory estoppel.201 Restatement (Second) § 90 
famously provides that a promise may become binding, even in the absence 
of bargained-for consideration, if a party changes her position in reasonable 
reliance on the promise.202 Note further that the language of § 90 explicitly 
mentions the possibility of actionable third-party reliance.203 This means 
that a third party might still sue a promisor under a direct promissory 
estoppel theory, assuming that the third party has taken action or 
 
200  Admittedly, in the creditor–beneficiary context, the unavailability of third-party rights might 
have the effect of inefficiently requiring two lawsuits instead of one: (1) the beneficiary’s lawsuit 
against the promisee and (2) the promisee’s lawsuit against the promisor. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, 
at 1392. 
201  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
202  The exact language reads: 
§ 90. Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance 
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the 
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding 
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach 
may be limited as justice requires. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
203  Henry Smith has recognized this risk: 
[T]hird-party beneficiary contracts create the potential for unfair surprise. Third persons, who 
presumably lack information about private understandings between the parties, may rely on the 
contract’s language in planning their own affairs. In these circumstances, giving priority to the 
shared intent of the parties poses the risk of substantial hardship. 
Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1186 
(2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”? 
The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1174 (1998)). 
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forbearance on a statement in the contract, even if a formal default rule 
would deny a third-party-beneficiary claim. 
Return, for example, to the lawn mowing example used earlier in this 
Article: Abe promises to pay Beth $50 to mow Cam’s lawn. But Beth never 
shows up to complete the job, and Abe cannot be bothered to bring a 
lawsuit against Beth. Under my default rule, Cam would not enjoy third-
party enforcement rights because Abe and Beth did not mention the 
possibility of outside claims at all in their agreement. Cam, however, might 
still maintain a promissory estoppel claim against Beth if he heard about the 
contract with Abe, took some action or forbearance in reliance on that 
contract, and a court ruled that justice required Beth to keep her promise.204 
Similarly, a third-party promissory estoppel claim might be expected in the 
creditor–beneficiary context, especially if the third party fails to enforce the 
initial claim in reliance on this substitute contract. Of course, there is 
considerable ambiguity surrounding reliance claims, and it may not always 
be clear exactly when it should be reasonable for an outsider to rely on 
promises made between two other people. But the promissory estoppel 
theory should protect against egregious reliance problems, even in the 
absence of third-party-beneficiary rights.205 
Finally, a more formal default rule is justifiable as a mechanism for 
channeling explicit documentation of third-party rights. We routinely deny 
contractual enforcement privileges under the indefiniteness doctrine, even if 
this may frustrate the expectations of the contracting parties. The 
justification here is grounded in an externality problem: it does not make 
sense to allow parties to externalize the costs of forming a contract on the 
courts via interpretation litigation. This same logic applies to the 
availability of third-party claims. Since the contract between the initial 
counterparties is the sole legal basis for outside rights, we should require 
some formal documentation of third-party enforcement or annul the claims 
of others by analogy to indefiniteness. This will provide incentives for 
clearer documentation of contractual intention and drive down both 
litigation expense and adjudicatory error.206 
 
204  It is possible, of course, that Beth’s liability might also be reduced under RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 “as justice requires.” 
205  For more on the historical embrace and continued legal robustness of promissory estoppel, see 
Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the “Invisible 
Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 (1985); Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and 
Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969); Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New 
Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 
(1998); and Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45 
(1996). 
206  This move towards a “formalist” approach to third-party rights is also consistent with recent 
academic literature suggesting that greater reliance on contractual text would help the overall 
interpretive task. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of 
Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
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3. Renegotiating Rights away from Third Parties.—Finally, how 
should we understand efforts by the initial counterparties to revoke third-
party rights through modification of an agreement that clearly conveys these 
rights? Here I would argue that there is less need for change. Rather, the 
approach taken by Restatement (Second) § 311 is a sensible way to deal 
with the modification problem, though one or two slight adjustments might 
be preferable.207 
First, by default, a grant of third-party rights should be revocable by 
mutual modification. If the goal of contract law is to support private gains 
via trade, then a mutual revocation or modification of outsider rights is 
ample evidence that the situation has changed and that the initial 
counterparties expect to benefit further by an adjustment to the broadcast 
contract. This approach is also consistent with a notion that third-party 
rights spring from the intent of promisor and promisee: if that intent 
changes, then so should the rights. 
There should be two exceptions, however, to this general presumption 
that modification can annul third-party-beneficiary claims. First, a third 
party who loses rights should still be able to pursue a promissory estoppel 
claim under Restatement (Second) § 90. It is quite easy to imagine that third 
parties might reasonably rely on a contract expressly designating them as 
beneficiaries, and subsequent reversals could bring liability under § 90 
when a significant investment or forbearance has occurred, just as any other 
statement to a third party can invite reliance claims.208 
Second, a promisor and promisee should be able to contract for 
irrevocable, ironclad third-party rights if they clearly document this 
preference. As discussed earlier,209 the effectiveness of broadcast 
contracting will be undermined if outsiders fear that the purported 
commitment can be easily reversed via modification. Accordingly, some 
parties may indeed wish to opt into an irrevocable commitment to gain the 
full benefits of broadcast contracting. Contract law should support explicit 
 
Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010). But see STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT 
INTERPRETATION (2009) (criticizing the formalist approach to interpretation); Shawn J. Bayern, Rational 
Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CALIF. 
L. REV. 943 (2009) (same); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Interpretive Risk and Contract Interpretation: A 
Suggested Approach for Maximizing Value, 2 ELON L. REV. 109 (2011) (same). 
207  It is not clear to me, for example, why third-party assent to a benefit in response to a request by 
promisor or promisee should play any part in annulling future attempts by the initial counterparties to 
adjust third-party rights. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311(3). This is simply assent to 
a gift promise and should not, without more, make a legal difference. The question may be entirely 
academic, however, as I am not aware of any case involving a dispute of this nature. 
208  It is not clear to me, however, why the broader rights provided by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 311(3)—annulling the attempted modification of rights instead of protecting the third 
party’s reliance interest—is the optimal approach. Rather, I would think that these claims could be 
adjudicated under a § 90 theory. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1419. 
209  See supra Part II.D. 
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language to that effect. Fortunately, Restatement (Second) § 311 does 
exactly that.210 
CONCLUSION 
Sorting legal concepts into traditional doctrinal cubbyholes is an untidy 
endeavor. Torts bump up against crimes, and constitutional law collides 
with procedure. In this vein, contract law scholars sometimes joke that most 
legal topics can be swallowed by private ordering. Recently, this hyperbole 
has become more interesting as individuals purport to modify regimes like 
civil procedure, tort, and property by contract.211 These attempts to shove 
legal concepts through the sieve of contract law raise significant concerns—
both about preserving necessary legal safeguards and about the ability of 
contract law to manage the mashup. 
Broadcast contracting should be seen as one manifestation of this 
trend. This Article has demonstrated how a promisor can use the law of 
third-party beneficiaries to broadcast a binding commitment to many 
different outsiders. This is quite distinct from bilateral contracting, and it is 
a powerful legal construct, allowing a promisor to instantly adjust her legal 
obligations in diverse areas of activity. The concerns about using contracts 
to evade legal obligations are not normally present in this context, however, 
because broadcast contracting is limited to expanding (not diminishing) 
baseline legal commitments. The ability to explicitly define who receives 
enforcement rights—and thereby to exclude some classes of outsiders—is 
also an important feature of broadcast contracting, raising interesting 
concerns about balkanized legal microcosms. 
From a normative perspective, this Article has advanced two general 
propositions. First, contract law should continue to empower private parties 
to write broadcast contracts and convey outside enforcement rights. The 
private strategic gains of one-stop multilateral commitment rest 
comfortably with the underlying goals of contract law. Second, legal 
treatment of third-party claims relies far too heavily on conjecture about a 
vague standard. In this context, the goals of contract law would be better 
served by moving toward a rule that, grounded in the familiar concerns of 
the indefiniteness doctrine, insists on explicit grants of third-party rights as 
a precondition to outside liability. 
 
 
210  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311(1). 
211  See sources cited supra note 131. 
